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and implement a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, intended to improve 
the nation’s preparedness for national catastrophes, including terrorist attacks.  DHS’s 
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to set priorities responding to a wide range of potential, but uncertain challenges and 
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implementation.  These factors range from setting out the business case for CBP adoption 
to necessary organizational and cultural enablers.  In conclusion, the thesis recommends 
enhancing the CBP approach to national preparedness planning through integrating its 
approach with a national preparedness management standard, coverage of the mission 
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A. MANAGING FOR RESULTS 
Over the past several years, government’s “managing for results” movement has 
shifted management attention from inputs, processes, and outputs to what they 
accomplish—outcomes or results.  Wholey (2002, p. 14) defines results-oriented 
management as “the purposeful use of resources and information to achieve and 
demonstrate measurable progress toward outcome-oriented agency and program goals.”  
Newcomer (1997) pinpoints the importance of linking measures to program mission, 
setting performance targets, and reporting whether the target levels of performance or 
expected results were achieved.  Aristigueta (1999) writes that the rationale for results 
management is that government’s effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability will 
improve as agencies focus management on what programs should achieve. 
A few months after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, David (2002, pp. 2-
3) presented the challenge of managing results for homeland security.  Focusing on the 
need to set a homeland security goal, she observed that a goal would provide a context to 
make decisions, set investment priorities, and measure progress.  A few years later, a 
presidential homeland security directive required a national preparedness goal, priorities, 
targets, and measures.  In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began 
implementing the presidential directive through a capabilities-based planning approach 
(CBP) adopted from the Department of Defense (DoD).  Kelley and others (2003) and 
Davis (2002) describe CPB as planning under uncertainty to develop the means—
capabilities—to respond to a wide range of potential challenges and circumstances while 
mindful of costs and sustainability. 
This thesis recommends an approach to better leverage CBP for national 
preparedness planning by combining it with other components.  The thesis first provides 
an overview of homeland security and preparedness expectations.  Second, it presents an 
overview of CBP concepts and methodology.  Third, it describes the DHS adoption of 
CBP and its current status.  Fourth, it describes components for CBP implementation, 
drawing on experiences of DoD and other allied countries’ defense communities.  Fifth, 
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the thesis contrasts the homeland security and defense community components, 
transferability factors, and other implementation issues.  Finally, it recommends 
integrating CBP with a national management system standard, comprehensive homeland 
security mission area coverage, and performance partnerships. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The primary research method was a content analysis of 1) homeland security 
literature, government strategies and reports, formally chartered commissions examining 
homeland security and homeland defense, and observations of experts in the field 
describing results expectations, strategies, and measurement, 2) public sector literature on 
managing for results, including performance management and measurement approaches, 
implementation strategies, and challenges, and 3) material on defense community and 
homeland security adoption of capabilities-based planning.  In addition, the author 
participated in several meetings and conferences on capabilities-based planning and is an 
active participant on committees involved with national emergency management and 
national preparedness standards.  This material was used in a synthesis approach to 
describe and analyze homeland security mission results expectations, defense community 
capabilities-based planning experiences and core components, homeland security 
adoption of capabilities-based planning, and enhancements for homeland security 
capabilities-based planning. 
Homeland security results management is an uncertain area at present.  Well-
defined approaches, including capabilities-based planning, have not been rigorously 
tested.  As part of the methodology, the author asked homeland security and defense 
community experts to review findings and recommendations about the preliminary CBP 
adoption.  The experts included officials from the Government Accountability Office’s 
Homeland Security and Justice Team (four officials), Defense Capabilities Management 
Team (two), and Advanced Research Methods Team (one); the Analytical Services’ 
Homeland Security Institute (three); the George Washington University’s Homeland 
Security Policy Institute (two); the Congressional Research Service (one); the 
Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff (one); the National Emergency Management 
Accreditation Program (one); the American National Standards Institute (three); the IBM  
 3
Business of Government program (one), BearingPoint, Inc. (two), and the Department of 
Homeland Security (three).  In addition, selected state and local officials were asked to 
review the draft thesis (three). 
The experts’ observations were incorporated into the final thesis.  The experts 
agreed with the characterization of the implementation factors, their importance, and the 
utility of integrating CBP with other tools and approaches.  State and local officials 


























II. HOMELAND SECURITY AND NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
OVERVIEW 
A. DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY 
The definition of homeland security is the starting point for managing homeland 
security results.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland 
Security 2002, p. 2) defines homeland security in sweeping terms as “a concerted 
national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur.”  The National Strategy defines these areas more fully, where: 
• Prevention means action at home and abroad to deter, prevent, and 
eliminate terrorism. 
• Vulnerability reduction means identifying and protecting critical 
infrastructure and key assets, detecting terrorist threats, and augmenting 
defenses, while balancing the benefits of mitigating risk against economic 
costs and infringements on individual liberty. 
• Response and recovery means managing the consequences of attacks, and 
building and maintaining the financial, legal, and social systems to 
recover. 
The more broadly-scoped “national preparedness” covers any major disaster or 
emergency event, including terrorist attacks, as part of all-hazards planning.  For 
example, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) defines preparedness as 
the “existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the 
federal, state, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover 
from major events” (The White House 2003, p. 2).  The National Incident Management 
System (DHS 2004a, p. 4) adds personal qualification and certification standards and 
publication management processes and activities to the HSPD-8 definition. 
The December 2003 Gilmore Commission (formally known as the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 
Mass Destruction) report stresses capacity for preparedness.  It defines preparedness as 
“the measurable demonstrated capacity by communities, States, and private sector entities 
throughout the United States to respond to acute threats with well-planned, well-
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coordinated, and effective efforts by all of the essential participants, including elected 
officials, police, fire, medical, public health, emergency managers, intelligence, 
community organizations, the media, and the public at large” (Gilmore Commission 
2003, p. 8). 
B. HOMELAND SECURITY GOALS AND STRATEGIES 
Whether the more narrowly targeted homeland security mission or the broader 
national preparedness definition is used, there are many expectations for what homeland 
security or national preparedness should accomplish and how.  National strategies, 
presidential directives, and reports from Congressionally-charted commissions provide 
rich sources of expectations. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security (National Strategy) is the primary 
document that frames results expectations.  The National Strategy defines homeland 
security and its missions, what should be accomplished, and the most important goals, 
current accomplishments, and recommendations for federal and non-federal governments, 
the private sector, and citizen action.  The core of the National Strategy is its six critical 
mission areas focusing on prevention, vulnerability reduction, and response and recovery 
expectations.  The mission areas include: 
• Intelligence and warning: Deter terrorist activity before it manifests itself 
in an attack so proper preemptive, preventative, and protective action can 
be taken; 
• Border and transportation security: Promote the efficient and reliable flow 
of people, goods, and services across borders while preventing terrorists 
from using transportation conveyances or systems to deliver implements 
of destruction; 
• Domestic counterterrorism: Identify, halt, and where appropriate, 
prosecute terrorists in the United States, including those directly involved 
in terrorist activity and their sources of support; 
• Critical infrastructure and key asset protection: Protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure and key assets to levels appropriate to each target’s 
vulnerability and criticality; 
• Catastrophic threat defense: Develop new approaches, a focused strategy, 
and a new organization to address chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear terrorist attacks; and 
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• Emergency preparedness and response: Develop a comprehensive national 
system to bring together and coordinate all necessary response assets 
quickly and effectively. 
The National Strategy also sets out four foundations of the six mission areas to 
involve all levels of government and sectors of society.  The foundations are law, science 
and technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation.  The 
National Strategy is joined by other national strategies, described by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) (2004a, table 2, pp. 5-6), covering other security aspects or 
expanding implementation details for specific topics.  These strategies include, for 
example, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection 
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.  Each strategy has specific objectives.  To 
illustrate, the critical infrastructures and key assets strategy has objectives to 1) identify 
and assure the protection of the most critical assets, 2) ensure protection of infrastructures 
and assets facing specific, imminent threats, and 3) pursue collaborative measures and 
initiatives to ensure the protection of other potential targets. 
DHS’s first strategic plan (Department of Homeland Security 2004b, p. 9) also 
identifies a series of strategic goals for securing the homeland from terrorist attacks, 
similar to the National Strategy.  In addition to organizational excellence, these included: 
• Awareness: Identify and understand threats, assess vulnerabilities, 
determine potential impacts, and disseminate timely information to our 
homeland security partners and the American public; 
• Prevention: Detect, deter, and mitigate threats to our homeland; 
• Protection: Safeguard our people and their freedoms, critical 
infrastructure, property, and the economy of our nation from acts of 
terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies; 
• Response: Lead, manage, and coordinate the national response to acts of 
terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies. 
• Recovery: Lead national, state, local, and private sector efforts to restore 
services and rebuild communities after acts of terrorism, natural disasters, 
or other emergencies. 
• Service: Serve the public effectively by facilitating lawful trade, travel, 
and immigration. 
 8
In addition to the high-level direction provided by these national strategies, 
homeland security presidential directives outline homeland security expectations, many 
much the same as the strategies.  These include, for example, immigration policies to 
combat terrorism, provide domestic incident management, and protect critical 
infrastructure.  The national strategies and presidential directives are further joined by the 
recommendations of Congressionally-chartered commissions.  In addition to the Gilmore 
Commission, other well-known commissions include the Bremer Commission (formally 
known as the National Commission on Terrorism), the Hart-Rudman Commission 
(formally known as the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century), and the 
9/11 Commission (formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States).  Table 1 highlights the major recommendation areas of these 
commissions, with illustrative examples, drawing on a Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report (2004b). 
 
Table 1. Examples of Commission Recommendations 
Recommendation Areas Examples 
Border and Transportation 
Security 
Integrate US border security into larger network of transportation system screening 
points 
Complete biometric entry-exit screening system 
Domestic Counterterrorism 
 
Track and confront terrorist financing and travel 
Make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard 
Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Asset Protection 
Set-risk based priorities 
Designate DHS as the lead and USDA as the technical advisor on food safety and 
agriculture and emergency preparedness 
International Antiterrorism Identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries 
Make long-term commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan 
Confront US-Saudi relationship problems 
Negotiate more comprehensive treaties and agreements for combating terrorism with 
Canada and Mexico 
Roots of Terrorism 
 
Provide moral leadership and action; define and defend ideals abroad 
Encourage economic development, open societies 
Develop comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism 
State and Local Assistance Reform homeland security grant-making and funding sustainability; base assistance 
on risk assessment 
Develop comprehensive process for training and exercise standards 
Revise Homeland Advisory System; adopt Incident Command System 
Private Sector Engagement Promote the adoption of a recommended standard for private preparedness 
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevent proliferation of WMD 
Use authority to designate foreign governments as not fully cooperating 
Establish DoD unified command structure for catastrophic terrorist capabilities 
Intelligence and Information 
Sharing 
 
Establish National Counterterrorism Center, built on TTIC and be a center for joint 
operational planning and joint intelligence 
Replace DCI with a National Intelligence Director 
Aggressively recruit human intelligence sources on terrorism 
Develop and disseminate continuing comprehensive strategic threat assessments 
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Recommendation Areas Examples 
Designate authorities to grant clearances recognized by all federal agencies; develop 
a new regime of clearances and classification of intelligence for dissemination to 
states, localities, private sectors 
Establish a specialized and integrated national security workforce 
Establish comprehensive procedures for sharing information with relevant state and 
local officials 
 
C. SETTING EXPECTATIONS 
One might argue that implementing all the goals and objectives from the many 
sources mentioned above would ensure comprehensive homeland security.  However, the 
argument can be made that the many expectations are tantamount to “laundry lists” that 
may do little to significantly improve homeland security.  Instead, there should be a 
formal process to systematically set what homeland security or national preparedness 
programs should achieve, even though such a process will be challenging. 
Even before the September 11 attacks, Falkenrath (2001) identified issues in 
defining reasonable and measurable preparedness goals, sustaining preparedness 
capabilities over time as resource commitments changed, and leveraging a preparedness 
program to fulfill multiple government priorities.  He, like David (2002), recognized that 
the lack of measurable objectives would prevent the rational allocation of resources and 
meaningful measurement of progress. 
After the September 11 attacks, Kettl (2002) also wondered what homeland 
security performance systems might work.  He identified possible approaches based on 
outcomes (the presence or absence of a terrorist attack), basic thresholds of preparedness 
(such as response plans, mutual aid compacts, and equipment availability), and a 
statistical index of preparedness based on variables (such as the availability of basic 
equipment and supplies, training and exercises, and external assessments).  An 
independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (2003, p. 8) 
identified national standards of preparedness as essential capabilities.  The task force 
advocated a minimal level of preparedness and equipment.  It urged performance 
standards to tie funding initiatives to systematic preparation.  It also wanted the degree 
and quality of nationwide preparedness to be measured. 
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Others emphasize preparedness expectations should further be tied to risk.  For 
example, in its final report, the Gilmore Commission (2003, p. 2) wrote the nation’s 
response to terrorists threats should be measured by how risk is managed, not by seeking 
total security.  More recently, the 9/11 Commission (9/11 Commission 2004) 
recommended basing homeland security assistance on assessing risks and vulnerabilities, 
including population and critical infrastructure within each state.  The Commission 
envisioned a panel of security experts to develop written benchmarks for evaluating 
community needs, with federal homeland security funds allocated according to those 
benchmarks. 
What all agree on is that capabilities must be prioritized, funded, sustained, and 
assessed to set and update homeland security goals and strategies.  Moreover, the 
capabilities should be defined as a central component of a risk-based planning approach.  
The next chapter describes the capabilities-based planning approach and its specific 
features that address these requirements. 
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III. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING OVERVIEW 
A. CBP ELEMENTS AND PROCESS 
Capabilities-based planning is one approach that meets, at least on the surface, the 
need to manage risk, set specific preparedness goals and priorities, make investment 
choices, and evaluate preparedness results.  The crafters of the CBP approach stress the 
abilities to accomplish clearly-defined missions in an atmosphere of uncertainty as a 
fundamental condition and efficient portfolio management as a necessary component.  
Capabilities are intended to define future operational needs.  Davis (2002, p. 4) includes 
three key elements in his description of CBP for the defense community: 
• A conceptual framework for planning under uncertainty by emphasizing 
capability flexibility, robustness, and adaptiveness, 
• An analytical framework with three components: understanding capability 
needs; assessing capability options at the level of mission or operation; 
and choosing capability levels and among capability options  Choices are 
done through a portfolio framework that considers other factors such as 
force management, different types of risk, and economic limitations, and 
• A solution framework that emphasizes building blocks. 
 





























space from sense of 






































Hierarchical elements; often 




Davis’ model starts with intelligence, strategic studies, and experiences that result 
in what he calls “plausible worries” (p. 15).  The “plausible worries” are the wide range 
of potential future threats that produce specific and generic scenarios for action.  These 
scenarios can be specific events or longer-term scenarios and should deal with the current 
term, mid-term, and longer-term timeframes.  Scenario inputs can include the political-
military context, an adversary’s objectives and strategies, forces, force effectiveness, 
environment, and strategic assumptions, such as how fast maneuvering forces can move. 
The scenarios produce, Davis explains, a sense of needs and related capabilities, 
which enter an analytical framework to define specific capabilities.  His analytical 
framework 1) defines an operational challenge (mission objectives, measures of strategic 
and operational success), 2) considers a set of options (forces, weapons, command and 
control, logistics, doctrine, plans, skills, readiness) for meeting the operational challenge, 
3) analyzes mission-system capabilities across a wide range of highly uncertain 
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circumstances (scenario space), and 4) generates an assessment of options that distinguish 
among situations, characterize risk, and evaluate flexibility, adaptiveness, and robustness.  
The end-point is making choices among options for mission requirements and the ways to 
achieve them, including considering tradeoffs in capabilities and addressing issues such 
as the impact on others, such as allies.  Understanding potential requirements, developing 
proposed capabilities, and evaluating capability options are done at multiple levels both 
within and across organizational components.  Thus, Davis has included hierarchy 
symbols in his model graphic to reflect the multiple levels of analysis and decision-
making. 
For results management, the end product might be measures for success contained 
in what Davis calls “envelopes of capability” (p. 18).  These envelopes define specific 
operational needs.  For example, one envelope of capability he cites is the number of 
cities that can be simultaneously supported with rescue and decontamination teams.  In 
his framework, goals, requirements, and measures are conceived much more in terms of 
these capability envelopes than particular scenarios. 
In later work, Davis (2003) says that the scientific way to look at uncertainty is to 
acknowledge that wars and military competitions are complex adaptive systems.  Small 
events can have large effects and the system itself is not a constant.  The planning 
approach starts with the core environment, or “no-surprises” future.  Then two types of 
uncertainties are identified.  One type are uncertainties that are taken seriously and 
monitored.  They will be resolved at some point as events occur and addressed by in-
depth contingency plans.  Another type are plausible events that are considered mostly 
unlikely, but if they occur, can be disruptive. 
Davis says planners should develop a broad strategy that would prevent surprises.  
The approach should include a series of sub-strategies employed on a contingent basis to 
deal with deviations from what was anticipated in the future.  It also should include a set 
of actions for more ad hoc adaptations to contingencies.  The strategy should be designed 
to positively shape the environment and influence the future.  Davis goes on to say that 
strategic planning to address uncertainty is about judging how best to allocate 
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investments—a portfolio management approach.  He describes a scorecard approach as 
part of a desirable planning structure. 
His framework considers the potential benefits of a new capability and deciding 
how much mission capability is needed.  In addition, capability building blocks must be 
suitably identified, tailored, and assembled at different levels of organizations and 
through networks.  He states that the defense building blocks for capabilities will be in 
many forms, such as battalions and brigades; operations to accomplish missions, such as 
halt an invading army; operational concepts to accomplish operations, such as how to 
specifically suppress air defenses to help halt an invading army; and resources in the form 
of platforms such as aircraft, physical systems, such as radars, and enabling 
infrastructure, such as the global information grid. 
B. INCLUSION OF RESULTS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES 
AND ELEMENTS 
Davis’ CBP approach captures elements found in well-known results management 
approaches and thus is a viable framework for setting homeland security capabilities.  
These approaches include 1) traditional strategic planning to set goals, objectives, 
strategies, and measures, 2) a program logic model, 3) scenario-based planning, and 4) 
risk management.  These approaches and their elements are briefly summarized in Table 
2. 
Table 2. Results Management Approaches 
Approach Description Core Elements 
Traditional Formal goal-setting, measurement, 
and assessment system 
Mission driven expectations 
Strategic and short-term goals and 
objectives 




Theory of program performance 
displayed as conversion of inputs to 
outputs leading to outcomes and 
desired impacts 
Logical, explicit argument of program 
intervention and impact production 
Identification of links for production 
Targeted monitoring of conversion from 
inputs to outputs to outcomes 
Scenario-Based 
Planning 
Identify and plan for possible short 
and long-term futures and outcomes 
Conceptualizing possible futures and 
outcomes 
Strategies to address most probable or 
common across the scenarios 
Risk Management Analysis and decision making to 
achieve an affordable, acceptable 
level of risk 
Risk and capability assessment 
Risk profile 
Risk-based decision-making 
Evaluation of results 
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The traditional results management approach contains elements of formal goal-
setting, measurement, and assessment as part of a strategic planning effort.  Typically, a 
traditional strategic planning approach consists of several parts (Hatry 1999 and Bryson 
1995).  One part is defining the mission from legislation, stakeholder performance 
expectations, or other mission statement or mandate sources.  A second part is clarifying 
strategic and shorter-term goals and objectives from everything possible an organization 
or program might try to achieve.  Long-term programmatic, policy, and management 
goals set the stage for expected performance levels between two points in time, creating a 
“vital few” performance goals and specific objectives.  Third is developing supporting 
outcome and process measures.  For each vital goal and related objectives, an 
organization defines what has to happen and possible measures to evaluate progress and 
compares them to existing process and outcome measures.  A final set of measures is 
selected and incorporated into a measurement system from the activity to the enterprise 
level.  The last part is putting the measures to work—measures are communicated to an 
organization, baselines and benchmarks defined, strategies (programs, resources, policies, 
actions) put in place, and progress tracked and reinforced.  Goals, strategies, and 
assessment across organizational boundaries may be included, but not often as a main 
feature.  In addition, the traditional approach typically includes performance-based 
budgeting, where investment decisions are aligned with expected performance (GAO 
1997). 
A second approach is a program logic model, also known as a chain of evidence 
or program theory of action.  A program logic model defines program performance or 
results in terms of a reasonable, sequential “conversion” process: initial inputs are 
converted to produce outputs that lead to outcomes and final impacts.  It provides 
guidance on what should be monitored to achieve expected immediate, intermediate, and 
ultimate effects, and makes clear connections from inputs to those effects (see, for 
example, Hatry 1999; McLaughlin and Jordan 1998, 2004; Millar, Simeone, and 




points of success and failure for program achievements.  Performance measurement 
occurs across the logic model to include capacity, conversion, and effectiveness or impact 
measures. 
A third approach is scenario-based planning.  Long-term (stretching over many 
years) scenario planning was originally designed to deal with how a firm’s managers 
could craft a successful course into the future in the face of significant uncertainty (see, 
for example, Schwartz and Ogilvy, 1998, p. 2).  Scenario planning asks what the future 
might hold and considers many different possible futures of developments and related 
outcomes.  Not knowing which scenario or variation of a scenario might develop, 
managers craft strategies to address all scenarios.  Longer-term scenario development can 
help officials anticipate variables and their relationships.  For example, the U.S. Coast 
Guard (McClellan, 2004) uses scenario planning to describe five alternative futures in 
2025, such as “Forever War,” which features continued terrorist attacks, long-term 
occupation of Arab countries, and a growing rivalry with China.  Specific event, short-
term scenarios also are used in planning, such as detailed threat scenarios for 
preparedness exercises  Considering multiple scenarios also can help identify strategies 
common across the scenarios in a form of nonlinear planning. 
A final results management approach is risk management.  This is the process of 
assessing asset value (including people), ranking priorities, and executing decisions under 
uncertainty to achieve an acceptable level of risk at an affordable cost to support the 
organization’s mission.  Risk management tools often are used at a facility level, but can 
be applied to a large scope, such as an organization or a community.  The risk 
management process consists of four parts—risk and capability assessment, risk profile 
development, risk-based decisionmaking, and evaluating results and adjusting risk 
management action (ASIS International, 2003 and Treasury Board of Canada, 2001). 
CBP planning incorporates the main features of these four approaches.  CBP sets 
requirements and measures through a process of scenario-analysis.  It then selects 
options, and makes final decisions through multiple levels of analysis and decision-
making.  These are features of traditional planning.  Like the program logic model, CBP 
considers a set of options to meet operational needs or outcomes.  Scenario-based 
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planning is reflected in the use of specific events or longer-term scenarios dealing with 
current term, mid-term, and longer-term timeframes.  Finally, CBP addresses risk 
management through upfront intelligence about possible disruptive events, analyzing 
capabilities across uncertain circumstances and risk characteristics, and then making 
investment choices about how to achieve mission requirements.  Overall, CBP’s process 
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IV. DHS CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING ADOPTION AND 
CURRENT STATUS 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 8 
The directive underlying DHS’ CBP adoption is HSPD-8.  Issued by the President 
in December 2003, HSPD-8 called for the DHS Secretary, in coordination with other 
federal officials and in consultation with state and local governments, to develop a 
national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.  The goal is to establish readiness 
priorities that are measurable.  It is to balance the potential threat and magnitude of 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources required to 
prevent, respond to, and recover from them.  It is to include readiness measures and focus 
on standards for preparedness assessments and strategies and a system to assess the 
nation’s overall preparedness to respond to major events, especially terrorist acts.  The 
due date for the national preparedness goal was set as the DHS fiscal year 2006 budget 
submission.  Federal preparedness assistance was to be delivered based on state all-
hazard preparedness strategies consistent with the national preparedness goal by 
September 30, 2005 (The White House 2003). 
Congress subsequently mandated a national preparedness requirement and its 
funding application.  The October 9, 2004 House-Senate conference report on the DHS 
fiscal year 2005 appropriations cited HSPD-8 implementation.  The report called for 
DHS’s Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP) 
to 1) provide state and local jurisdictions with nationally-accepted first responder 
preparedness levels no later than January 31, 2005, 2) include in the fiscal year 2005 
formula-based grant guidance guidelines for state and local jurisdictions to adopt national 
preparedness standards in fiscal year 2006, and 3) issue final guidance on the 
implementation of the national preparedness goal no later than March 31, 2005.  
According to OSLGCP (2004c), DHS planned to continue utilizing CBP to meet these 
Congressional requirements.  More recently, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 
2004 (P. L. 108-458) required DHS to set national performance standards and to ensure 
that state homeland security plans are in conformance with those standards. 
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B. HSPD-8 IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPT PAPER 
DHS consistently has taken the position, also required by HSPD-8, that DHS 
would develop the national preparedness goal and related priorities, targets, measures, 
and standards in coordination with federal organizations and in consultation with state, 
local, and tribal governments.  Since HSPD-8 was issued, DHS drew on experts and 
governmental and association representations in its rapid development of the national 
preparedness goal. 
In April 2004, DHS’s Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) issued a draft 
implementation concept paper for HSPD-8 (ODP 2004c).  According to the concept 
paper, federal preparedness programs must be reoriented in a more unified manner to 
deliver needed capabilities and correlate to threats.  A capability is defined as “a 
combination of resources (personnel, equipment, and other elements) that provide a 
means to achieve an outcome, under specified conditions and to national standards” (p. 
7).  “Unified” means efforts to allow all agencies and government levels with mission 
responsibility to work together by establishing a common set of objectives and strategies 
(p. 7).  The key actor is the homeland security community, which the document specifies 
as all levels of government and the private sector and their resources. 
The concept paper outlined unified capabilities as the foundation for preparedness 
programs.  Planning would be done as a nationally integrated effort and capabilities 
developed using a consistent community-wide view of priorities and risks.  The concept 
paper drew heavily on DoD documents and the Davis (2002) CBP approach. 
The draft concept paper stated that DHS had identified four priority initiatives to 
reorient current preparedness programs and implement HSPD-8.  These included (p. 9): 
• Creation of a unified national preparedness strategy to build the 
capabilities required by homeland security strategies, missions, and tasks. 
• Development of a capabilities-based national preparedness assessment and 
reporting system to conduct continuous subjective assessments of current 
national preparedness and to obtain a systematic view of future critical 
capabilities. 
• Establishment of a comprehensive national training and exercise system 
that provides performance-based training and exercises to achieve and 
sustain capabilities. 
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• Balancing of the national portfolio of preparedness investments through 
tools to inform resource allocation decisions that are linked to required 
capabilities. 
In the concept paper, implementing a unified national preparedness strategy 
started with building a common lexicon for capabilities citizens expected from elected 
officials and public agencies to address a terrorist attack, major disaster, or other 
emergency.  This list of mission-level capabilities could draw on documents such as the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Incident Management System 
Resource Typing System. 
Another key step was developing standard scenarios to plan, test alternative 
strategies, set requirements, and determine priorities as it is not possible to predict when 
and where an incident will occur.  The Homeland Security Council developed planning 
scenarios viewed as describing national significant threats and hazards with high 
credibility, consequence, and probability.  The scenarios included (ODP 2004c, p. 17): 
• Four chemical scenarios, including both chemical warfare and toxic 
industrial chemicals, 
• Three biological scenarios, including both contagious and non-contagious 
agents and pandemic influenza, 
• One radiological and one nuclear scenario, 
• One improvised explosive device scenario, 
• Two agricultural scenarios, including food safety and animal disease, 
• Two natural disaster scenarios, a catastrophic earthquake and major 
hurricane, and 
• One cyber attack. 
In July 2004, the Homeland Security Council (2004) issued executive summaries 
of the planning scenarios.  The Council document stated that the 15 scenarios were the 
minimum number necessary to test the range of response capabilities and resources.  The 
Council excluded other high-impact scenarios, such as industrial and transportation 
incidents or frequently occurring natural disasters.  These were considered to have well-
developed and tested response plans or the response would be a subset of response 
capabilities and resources included in the 15 scenarios. 
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The concept paper stated that the generation and maintenance of the 15 scenarios 
were to be integrated into the homeland security community’s strategic and operational 
planning systems.  The document detailed eight mission areas for each scenario response, 
such as a) prevention, deterrence, and protection and b) emergency management and 
response.  For example, for the nuclear detonation scenario, the prevention, deterrence, 
and protection mission area included law enforcement attempts to prevent the device’s 
development and detonation, protection and survey of site boundaries after the 
detonation, and response to any additional threats or looting or theft issues.  The mission 
areas drew in part on ODP work on homeland security exercises and evaluations. 
Finally, the concept paper said that scenario analysis would produce baseline 
capabilities lists.  The lists would include essential capabilities in specific missions 
considered critical to successfully accomplishing a scenario’s mission.  The lists would 
be further tailored to expectations for different jurisdictional tiers, such as localities of 
different sizes.  Limited measures would be used to assess achieving or exceeding the 
basic capabilities lists.  Entities below the federal level were expected to tailor the 
scenarios used in defining mission-level capabilities to their specific locations and 
environments.  However, the basic capabilities lists were considered the minimum 
capabilities required to carry out core competencies and essential tasks and would be 
used as the national preparedness standard. 
The concept paper (p. 20) included a CBP process model derived from Davis 
(2002), shown in Figure 2, to better explain the overall approach, key deliverables, and 
key decision points.  For example, the national preparedness goal of baseline capability 




 Figure 2.   DHS CBP Process Model 
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C. DEVELOPING THE INITIAL TASK LISTS 
ODP sponsored a Universal Task List Workshop in June 2004 to define the 
homeland security tasks that should be implemented at all government levels to prevent, 
respond to, and recover from major terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other 
emergencies.  Following that workshop, ODP (2004a) released a draft list of tasks for 
each scenario (with the exception of the cyber attack).  ODP asked for review of the tasks 
and whether they needed to be changed or augmented.  The resulting scenario lists of 
tasks then would be combined into a single Universal Task List (UTL). 
Tasks for each scenario were categorized in the major functional areas of 1) 
awareness, 2) preparedness, 3) prevention, 4) response, and 5) recovery.  Under each 
major area, sub-areas were defined, such as command, control, coordination; planning 
and revision; and intelligence and surveillance with related tasks.  For example, for the 
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anthrax scenario, shown in Figure 3, the functional area of preparedness had a sub-area of 
planning and revision, with a detailed task list for the sub-area. 
 
Figure 3.   Anthrax Scenario Sub-Areas 
Biological attack-aerosol anthrax: dispersal in late rush hour traffic exiting a large 
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In August 2004, ODP (2004b) requested comments on a July 2004 Universal 
Task List draft resulting from the work in June.  The UTL draft included every unique 
task identified from the analysis of tasks in individual scenario task lists.  The UTL was 
an important step in the CBP process as it would be used to develop a Target Capabilities 
List (TCL) and related conditions and measures of performance.  The manual 
accompanying the draft UTL stressed the value of the list in providing a common 
language and common reference for homeland security professionals at all government 
levels and in the private sector.  It also echoed a theme of emphasis on emergency 
response and recovery, stating that the universal list “facilitates requirements analysis by 
providing a template and a list of possible tasks that serve as a starting point for assessing 
what is required to respond to an event” (p. 2).  The manual stated that many documents  
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informed the task development process, such as the National Response Plan, the National 
Incident Management System, and the Emergency Management Accreditation Program 
Standard. 
DHS’s first UTL was organized by functional areas, including awareness, 
prevention, and response, familiar to first responder communities.  However, the August 
2004 draft UTL was organized in a much different manner.  It used four levels of 1) 
national strategic tasks; 2) planning, coordination, and support tasks; 3) incident 
management tasks; and 4) incident prevention and response tasks.  These categories 
reflected a level of responsibility and focus of action at an organizational level rather than 
function or operation: 
• The document described first level national strategic tasks as those 
normally performed by federal departments and agencies, such as 
developing national strategic intelligence. 
• The second level tasks generally related to the development of plans to 
prevent, respond to, and recover from significant events, coordination of 
efforts, and support for local responders, such as managing regional and 
state resources.  According to the document, any government level could 
perform these tasks, but it was expected actors below the national level 
would be involved. 
• The third level incident management tasks included resource management 
and support tasks, normally performed at the local level, such as 
coordinating urban search and rescue. 
• The last level of incident prevention and response were tasks performed in 
prevention or response activities, including protection, mitigation, and 
recovery.  These, according to the document, would be performed by large 
metropolitan areas, midsize, and small jurisdictions. 
Each task was further defined by sub-tasks.  For example, for the area “incident 
prevention and response,” the task to conduct incident management has five sub-tasks, 
with some defined by one or two more levels of tasks.  The document reiterated the 
selection of scenarios to define the UTL.  ODP planned to update the scenarios for 
changes in the homeland security strategic environment (ODP 2004a; OSLGCP 2004a). 
 26
D. ISSUANCE OF THE DRAFT NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL 
During the universal task list development, OSLGCP (2004a) issued a draft 
national preparedness goal for comment in September 2004.  This included extensive 
directions for implementing the goal and using a capabilities-based planning framework. 
The September 2004 goal (p. 6) was “Federal, State, local, and tribal entities will 
achieve and sustain a risk-based standard of national preparedness within 3 years (by 
September 30, 2008) that provides assurance of the Nation’s capability to prevent, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from major events, especially terrorism.”  Overall, 
the national preparedness goal, according to the document (p. 16), was to provide 
demonstrable national assurance that combined federal, state, local, and tribal capabilities 
are organized, manned, trained, equipped, well-led, and guided by sound policies, plans, 
and procedures. 
The September 2004 national goal document described seven elements of 
preparedness for HSPD-8 implementation (p. 8), described in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Preparedness Elements 
Element Description 
Guidance Including strategies, plans, operating procedures, regulations, or policies 
that govern or guide national preparedness activities. 
Organization Including organizations needed to conduct a homeland security mission 
or task, as well as organizational characteristics. 
Personnel Encompassing qualified personnel supporting a homeland security 
capability, including identification of the knowledge, skills, abilities, 
and competencies needed to perform a homeland security task. 
Training Including training content and all methods of delivering that content to 
intended audiences, which enables performance and support of 
homeland security missions and tasks. 
Equipment Encompassing materiel, supplies, and facilities used to prepare for, 
directly perform, or support a homeland security mission. 
Leadership Providing management, responsibility, and accountability across the 
spectrum of national preparedness elements. 
Linked Performance Encompassing the ability of the other elements to successfully interact 
to standard to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 
 
In the same document, OSLGCP listed eight mission areas to represent all 
incident management operations (p. 9).  The mission areas were the same as earlier draft 
mission areas and those used in the planning scenarios that scoped response 
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requirements.  These, according to the document, represented assigned or shared 
homeland security missions and the categories to bundle capabilities for interconnected 
sets of tasks.  The mission areas are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Mission Areas 
Mission Areas Ability To 
Prevention, Deterrence, 
Protection 
Prevent, deter, or protect against terrorist attacks. 
Emergency Assessment, 
Diagnosis 
Detect an incident, determine its impact, classify the incident, conduct 




Direct, control, and coordinate a response; provide emergency public 
information to the population at risk and the population at large; and 
manage resources.  This outcome includes direction and control through 
the Incident Command System, Emergency Operations Center, and Joint 
Information Center. 
Incident, Hazard Mitigation Control, collect, and contain an incident at its source and to mitigate the 
magnitude of its impact.  Includes all response tasks conducted at the 
incident scene except those associated with victim care. 
Public Protection Provide initial warnings to the population at large and at risk, notify 
people to shelter-in-place or evacuate; provide evacuee support (e.g., 
transportation); protect schools and special populations; and manage 
traffic flow and access to the affected area. 
Victim Care Treat victims at the scene, transport patients, treat patients at a medical 
treatment facility, track patients, handle and track human remains, and 
provide tracking and security of patients’ possessions and evidence. 
Investigation, Apprehension Investigate the cause and source of the attack; prevent secondary 
attacks; and identify, apprehend, and prosecute those responsible. 
Recovery, Remediation Ability to restore essential services, businesses and commerce, clean up 
the environment and render the affected area safe; compensate victims; 
provide long-term mental health and other services to victims and the 
public; and restore a sense of well-being in the community. 
 
According to the draft September 2004 national preparedness goal document, 
each mission area would be assessed across these preparedness elements (e.g., guidance) 
for 1) a specific entity or group of entities (e.g., departments or agencies, jurisdictions, 
states, areas, sectors, regions) operating individually or together, 2) for a specific 
scenario; or 3) collectively for entities or multiple scenarios.  The assessment would 
include a preparedness rating or scorecard for states, local jurisdictions, Indian tribes, and 
federal departments and agencies, in categories such as “capable,” “mostly capable,” and 
“partially capable.”  The document included a figure (Figure 3, p. 10) that represented the 
matrix to assess specific levels of preparedness for a mission area and preparedness 
element.  The matrix is shown in Figure 4. 


























The document further emphasized that a capabilities-based planning framework 
would be used to build the capabilities required for achieving the national preparedness 
goal.  The framework would include a Homeland Security Universal Task List (UTL) 
with associated conditions and task standards; a target capabilities list, organized by tier; 
performance measures; and national planning scenarios. 
E. REVISED UTL AND PROTOTYPE CRITICAL TASKS 
Based on comments on the August 2004 UTL draft, ODP revised the UTL to 
include every unique task identified from the analysis of tasks required to prevent and 
respond to the events in the scenarios.  The revision still kept categories such as national 
strategic tasks and incident management tasks.  In drafting the revised UTL, ODP 
partnered with the National Training Consortium (Center for Domestic Preparedness, 
Louisiana State University, Nevada Test Site, Texas A&M, and New Mexico Tech).  The  
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Consortium convened focus groups with subject matter experts to identify a list of critical 
tasks for the Target Capabilities List (TCL) and related capabilities, conditions, and 
measures of performance. 
According to DHS, the TCL was intended to define the capabilities to cope with 
diverse homeland security scenarios and to define conditions and measures of 
performance.  Conditions were those environmental variables that affect task 
performance, such as weather or the number of casualties.  Measures and performance 
criteria described a standard for how well a task must be performed and the basis for 
varying levels of acceptable task performance (ODP 2004b, OSLGCP 2004c).  Homeland 
security agencies could use the performance criteria to assess their ability to perform 
tasks for which they were responsible (OSLGCP 2004a). 
In October 2004, DHS conducted a capabilities workshop of primarily state and 
local officials to select critical capabilities by scenario and propose quantitative measures 
for each of the critical capabilities.  At the meeting and in written information (OSLGCP 
2004b), DHS stated that the CBP process for national preparedness would include ten 
detailed steps to answer preparedness questions: 
 
1. Define the threats—what are we preparing for?  The national planning scenarios 
define probable threats from terrorists, natural disasters, and other emergencies.  While 
the scenarios do not include every possible threat, those having the capacity to respond to 
these scenarios should have the skills and flexibility to respond to any emergency. 
 
2. Identify the tasks that need to be performed—what do we need to do to prevent or 
respond to the threat?  The UTL defines what tasks need to be performed by federal, 
state, and local governments and the private sector to prevent, respond to, and recover 
from events defined by the scenarios as well as other strategy and planning documents.  
The first UTL version contains tasks to be performed primarily by public agencies.  In 
2005, ODP will work with stakeholders to expand the UTL for private sector, non-
government organizations, and citizen groups. 
 
3. Identify the critical tasks—what are the most important tasks?  Critical tasks are 
those tasks that if not performed, will result in unsuccessfully preventing or responding to 
an event. 
 
4. Define required capabilities—what capabilities do we need to perform the critical 
tasks?  Capabilities are combinations of capability elements—personnel; planning;  
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organization and leadership; equipment; training; and exercises, evaluations, and 
corrective actions—providing the means to perform tasks under specified conditions and 
to national standards. 
 
5. Determine level of capabilities required—What level of the capabilities do we 
need?  Many of the tasks and capabilities are common across several or all of the 
scenarios, but stakeholders will need to set target capabilities’ levels balancing need with 
an acceptable level of risk. 
 
6. Assign responsibility for capabilities—Where should we, as a nation, place the 
required capabilities?  This step involves an analysis of which capabilities should be 
developed and maintained at the local level, regionally within states, at the state level, at 
a multi-state regional level, or by the federal government.  The analysis should include 1) 
the role of different levels of government for each capability and 2) the requirements for 
local jurisdictions of different sizes and risk levels, grouping jurisdictions into tiers to 
define tier capabilities. 
 
7. Define capabilities requirements for jurisdictions/agencies—What capabilities 
should my jurisdiction or agency have?  Tier capabilities will guide determinations of 
what each jurisdiction should have or have available through mutual aid.  The TCL for 
the tiers defines the range of capabilities for which local jurisdictions may use federal 
grant funds.  States and local jurisdictions would use federal funds only for those 
capabilities defined for their tier in the TCL. 
 
8. Assess current capabilities against target capabilities—Do we have adequate 
capabilities?  An assessment would contrast current capabilities against TCL 
requirements, determining gaps, deficiencies, and excess or overlaps. 
 
9. Allocate resources to address priority needs—How should we allocate our limited 
resources to make the most difference in preparedness?  Cost estimates would be 
determined for required capabilities to address gaps and deficiencies. 
 
10. Assess performance of tasks—How prepared are we?  Performance measures for 
each task will provide uniform criteria to measure task performance.  A preparedness 
scorecard will measure progress toward achieving specific preparedness objectives that 
support the national preparedness goal. 
 
DHS (OSLGCP 2004b) also provided workshop participants with an improvised 
explosives device (IED) scenario prototype to illustrate the use of CBP.  DHS estimated 
that approximately 1100 prevention and response tasks from the UTL would have to be 
performed for the IED scenario, with 71 considered critical.  The critical tasks range 
across nine of the ten mission areas identified in the National Preparedness Goal.  The 
prototype used tasks for the mission area of incident and hazard mitigation to explain the 
CBP process.  Drawing on the prototype information, Figure 5 illustrates the “waterfall” 
from this mission area to capabilities. 
 
Figure 5.   DHS Explosives Scenario Waterfall Example 
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task; can be a critical task
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Variables that may affect the 
performance of an organization, 
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response to a defined set of 
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personnel, planning, and 
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Incident and Hazard 
Mitigation
Conduct explosive device 
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F. STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS 
The October 2004 workshop participants overwhelmingly supported a national 
preparedness goal and standards, but many voiced major concerns with the CBP process 
and DHS progress to date (Caudle 2004; NEMA 2004; ASTHO 2004).  Their concerns 
emphasized proceeding with what one called a fatally flawed process following 
artificially-imposed timeframes to produce an invalid UTL.  Many participants 
characterized the UTL and capabilities lists as producing an untenable standard of care 
that could be considered in civil litigation cases. 
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Participants presented four major arguments highlighting significant flaws in the 
CBP process: 
• Lack of clarity about the expected outcome and rationale for the national 
preparedness goal’s selection of CBP as its planning framework and 
confusion about how CBP worked, particularly to define national level 
capabilities and thus later federal funding criteria for state and local 
entities.  Many believed the result would be an UTL planning framework 
and task list too large and too complex for realistic field use. 
• Anticipating that the entire nation—all jurisdictions—would contribute to 
the prevention, protection, and response and recovery for a large-scale 
event, with a heavy focus on terrorist attack scenarios that most 
jurisdictions likely would never encounter.  This “national response view” 
created an extremely detailed “one size fits all” national standard 
requirement for every jurisdiction.  The argument was that a sustained 
capacity may be needed in certain jurisdictions, but not every locality and 
state should be prepared for a large scale event.  Most jurisdictions, it was 
believed, could anticipate smaller-scale events, such as the use of 
explosive devices or natural hazards such as a flood, hurricane, or 
earthquake. 
• Ignoring 1) lessons learned from previous disasters, 2) already existing 
comprehensive assessments, plans, systems, and capabilities for 
preparedness at the state and local level, often in response to requirements 
imposed by DHS and other federal agencies, such as the Department of 
Health and Human Services, and 3) national management standards and 
related certification programs for emergency preparedness, such as the 
Emergency Management Accreditation Program based on a national 
management system standard, and the requirements of the National 
Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. 
• Failing to address what resources would be needed for timeframes before, 
during, and after an event.  The approach also ignores realities such as 
trends in surge preparedness or the inability to fund a surge capacity with 
current shortages or hold and resource capacity in anticipation of an event 
that would likely never happen. 
In November 2004, OSLGCP (2004c) responded to participants and reiterated the 
commitment to the rigorous timeline, justified the use of CBP, and emphasized the need 
for a coordinated national approach to enhance preparedness.  The rational was that 
threats and hazards faced were national in scope, and thus there should be a national 
preparedness perspective.  OSLGCP said that state and local jurisdictions were not 
expected to plan for and exercise all tasks in the UTL, but should only select tasks that 
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apply to their roles in specific homeland security missions for their level of government.  
However, local decision-making should be done within a national context of building and 
maintaining capabilities necessary for prevention, response, and recovery from large-
scale and smaller all-hazards incidents. 
G. MOVING TO ISSUANCE OF THE 2005 NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
GOAL 
In early December 2004, Gruber (2004a, 2004b) reported that a small group of 
state and local officials were working to streamline the task lists and capabilities 
templates.  He described HSPD-8 implementation as a transformation in building a true 
national preparedness capability.  It would, he said, provide the ability to measure task 
performance and the adequacy and sufficiency of capabilities against key risk scenarios.  
In the end, it should achieve an objective assurance of national performance and a 
rational method to allocate limited resources.  The Administration’s view was that there 
should be a national, objective assurance of readiness and he believed that CBP was the 
right approach to achieve that goal. 
However, he also recognized the difficulty of the implementation process.  In 
contrast to the DoD experience, he said DHS implementation of CBP must rely on a 
consensual community that would adopt the approach.  He recognized that a consensual 
approach is difficult with federalism concerns and the sovereignty of many stakeholders, 
such as states.  He stated that DHS should have spent more time in explaining the 
rationale for CBP adoption instead of devoting almost all its time to designing a CBP 
process for homeland security. 
The assurance of readiness is now presented as a cornerstone of federal homeland 
security grants.  ODP’s (2004f) fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program 
guidelines state that statewide all-hazards preparedness strategies are to be consistent 
with HSPD-8’s national preparedness goal.  During 2005, states are to review and 
incorporate the national planning scenarios, the UTL, and the TCL in their preparedness 
efforts, anticipating full implementation of HSPD-8 in 2006.  The guidelines also state 
that the TCL will include tiers for capability level differences among entities based on 
factors such as population density, critical infrastructure, and other risk factors. 
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In mid-December, DHS (OSLGCP 2004d) requested comments on a new draft list 
of capabilities that would be used for the TCL.  The capability categories included 1) 
prevention/intelligence, 2) agriculture and food, 3) incident management, 4) incident 
response, 5) public protection, 6) criminal investigation, 7) mass care, 8) public health 
and medical care, 8) public information, and 9) recovery.  By March 31, 2005, ODP 
planned on issuing a National Planning Guidance describing the national preparedness 
goal, the capability target levels, and how entities were to apply them in developing and 
updating preparedness assessments and strategies.  For fiscal year 2005, grantees were to 
use homeland security grant funding to develop capabilities to prevent, detect, interdict, 
and respond to improvised explosive devices.  The use of the improvised devices was 
considered to have a high probability of being used in a terrorist attack and was the CBP 
prototype.  It also might be interpreted as normalizing basic preparedness expectations.  
In other words, capabilities for improvised explosive devices established a baseline level 
of preparedness across the nation. 
In December 2004, DHS also issued a new version of the UTL that further 
defined the tasks and added more specifications, such as expanding intelligence and 
surveillance tasks as part of preventative efforts.  This version maintained the four levels 
that defined the types of tasks to be performed.  The draft August and December 2004 
UTL categories are very similar.  In April 2005, DHS issued another draft UTL version 
(OSLGCP 2005b).  However, the April 2005 version is a considerable departure from the 
two earlier versions and is now organized by mission areas and not level of 
responsibility. 
Table 5 contrasts the primary task categories for the December 2004 and April 
2005 UTL versions.  Each major category also has lower level tasks or objectives with 
one or more levels.  For example, the task category “manage national preparedness 
activities” has eight sub-task categories, such as “provide for the protection of national 
infrastructure.”  These sub-tasks have further categories, such as “develop and implement 
strategy and policies for secure cyberspace,” with another level, such as “promote a 
comprehensive national cyberspace defense awareness program.” 
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The April 2005 UTL contains approximately 1,800 tasks, still covering the 
national strategic to the local incident level.  Thus, the UTL is very detailed with list upon 
list of universal tasks.  Consistent with DHS statements, the UTL does not state how a 
task is to be performed.  DHS plans to add tasks for the private sector and the public at a 
later date. 
 
Table 5. Draft UTL Comparisons 
December 2004 UTL April 2005 UTL (Summaries of Objectives) 
National Strategic: Primarily federal departments 
and agencies. 
Common Tasks 
• Develop national strategic intelligence and surveillance 
• Manage national preparedness activities 
• Conduct national prevention operations 
• Provide for command and management of incidents of 
national significance 
• Provide national incident support 
• Manage national resources 
• Provide national communications and information 
management support 
• Support national technologies 
• Preparedness: Build, sustain, and improve the operational 
capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover 
from domestic incidents 
• Resource management: Coordinate and oversee tools, 
processes, and systems that provide incident managers with 
timely and appropriate resources during an incident 
• Communications and information management: Identify the 
requirements for a standardized framework for 
communications, information management, and information 
sharing support at all levels of incident management 
• Supporting technology: Provide supporting technology and 
technology systems essential to implement incident response 
actions 
Planning, Coordination, and Support: Primarily 
single states or groups of states, regions within 
states or counties, federal regions. 
Prevent Mission 
• Conduct regional, State and local intelligence and 
surveillance operations 
• Conduct regional, State and local preparedness activities 
• Conduct regional, State and local preparedness operations 
• Command and manage incidents 
• Provide regional and State incident support 
• Manage regional, tribal and State resources 
• Provide regional and State communications and information 
management support 
• Detect threats: Identify, assess, investigate and communicate 
terrorist activities, intentions, and capabilities in order to 
preempt and prevent attacks 
• Control access: Conduct security functions to prevent entry 
to the United States and/or access to targets within the United 
States of terrorists and the instruments of terror 
• Eliminate threats: Eradicate terrorist threats using all the 
tools in out Nation’s arsenal to stop those who wish to do us 
harm 
 
Incident Management Mayor, city manager, 
county executive, or emergency operations center. 
Protect Mission 
• Coordinate transportation operations 
• Operate/manage telecommunications and information 
technology 
• Manage/direct building department, public works and 
engineering 
• Coordinate firefighting operations 
• Coordinate incident management operations 
• Coordinate mass care, housing, and human services 
• Coordinate resource support 
• Coordinate public health and medical services 
• Coordinate urban search and rescue 
• Coordinate oil and hazardous materials response 
• Coordinate agriculture and natural resource response and 
recovery 
• Coordinate energy recovery 
• Coordinate public safety and security 
• Coordinate community recovery, mitigation, and economic 
stabilization 
• Assess critical infrastructure and key assets: Identify critical 
infrastructure, key resources, and other assets, assess 
potential consequence if they were destroyed or disrupted, 
assess potential vulnerabilities, prioritizing assets, and 
develop information sharing mechanisms to ensure flow of 
information between the public and private sector 
stakeholders 
• Protect critical infrastructure and key assets: Protect critical 
infrastructures and key assets that face a specific, imminent 
threat 
• Mitigate risk: Take strategic actions to raise security levels 
appropriate to each asset’s vulnerability and criticality 
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December 2004 UTL April 2005 UTL (Summaries of Objectives) 
• Coordinate emergency public information and external 
communications 
Incident Prevention and Response: Incident site 
personnel. 
Respond Mission 
• Assess incident: Determine the nature of the incident, 
investigate the cause of the incident, assess the situation, 
identify critical and unmet needs, provide recommendations 
for protective actions, and identify and coordinate acquisition 
and delivery of required assets and/or resources 
• Minimize impact: Implement and coordinate immediate 
actions to contain the direct effects of an incident 
• Care for public: Implement immediate actions to save lives 
and meet basic human needs to minimize the impact of an 
incident and prevent further inquiry 
 
Recover Mission 
• Provide transportation 
• Operate telecommunications and information technology 
• Conduct public works and engineering 
• Conduct firefighting 
• Conduct incident management 
• Provide mass care, housing, and human services 
• Provide resource support 
• Provide public health and medical services 
• Conduct urban search and rescue 
• Conduct oil and hazardous materials response 
• Support agriculture and natural resource recovery 
• Support energy recovery 
• Provide public safety and security 
• Support community recovery, mitigation, and economic 
stabilization 
• Provide emergency public information and external 
communications 
• Provide transportation 
• Operate telecommunications and information technology 
• Conduct building department, public works and engineering 
• Conduct firefighting 
• Conduct incident management 
• Provide mass care, housing, and human services 
• Provide resource support 
• Provide public health and medical services 
• Conduct urban search and rescue 
• Conduct oil and hazardous materials response 
• Support agriculture and natural resource recovery 
• Support energy recovery 
• Provide public safety and security 
• Support community recovery, mitigation, and economic 
stabilization 
• Provide emergency public information and external 
communications 
• Assist public: Help individuals directly impacted by an 
incident to return to pre-incident levels, where feasible. 
• Restore environment: Reestablish or bring back to a state of 
environmental or ecological health the water, air, and land 
and the interrelationship, which exists among and between 
water, air, and land and all living things 
• Restore infrastructure: Restore infrastructure in affected 
communities in order to return to pre-incident levels, where 
feasible 
 
On March 31, 2005, DHS issued the Interim National Preparedness Goal 
(OSLGCP 2005a).  However, the goal did not set an explicit national preparedness goal 
as it did in the September 2004 draft goal.  Instead, the interim goal established a 
“national vision” and priorities as steps toward setting measurable readiness benchmarks 
and targets.  The national vision is “to engage Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, 
their private and non-governmental partners, and the general public to achieve and 
sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the 
economy” (p. 3).  The new document presented several national readiness priorities 
intended to establish the most urgent needs for national preparedness, and include (p. 10): 
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• Implement the National Incident Management System and National 
Response Plan, 
• Expanded regional collaboration, 
• Implement the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
• Strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities, 
• Strengthen interoperable communications capabilities, 
• Strengthen chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive 
detection, response, and decontamination capabilities, and 
• Strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities. 
HSPD-8 calls for the establishment of national priorities.  However, it called for 
establishing measurable readiness priorities and targets that balance the threat and 
magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the required 
resources.  Emphasis on the national priorities presented above appears to be an awkward 
fit within the entire capabilities-based planning approach.  For example, the overarching 
priorities include implementing the National Incident Management System, National 
Response Plan, and Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  This approach 
appears counter to developing capabilities to meet the target capabilities list and 
addressing the national planning scenarios.  The guidance provides limited justification 
for pursuing the national priorities in addition to a more systematic capability-based 
planning approach for the planning scenarios. 
The document recounted DHS efforts to develop readiness targets, priorities, 
standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing national 
preparedness.  These efforts included using 1) CBP to define risk-based target levels of 
capability for readiness targets, 2) national priorities to guide preparedness efforts, and 3) 
other elements such as standards for preparedness assessments.  It also reiterated the 
justification for using the national planning scenarios and the TCL in defining 
preparedness.  The document emphasized that not every entity would be expected to 
develop and maintain every capability to the same level, recognizing that risk and the 
needs of different entities would require variations. 
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The most recent version of the TCL (OSLGCP 2005c) recommends 36 
capabilities to be developed and maintained, in whole or in part, by government 
organizations anticipating terrorist attacks and major disasters.  The complete list is 
shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Target Capabilities 
Categories Target Capabilities 
Common • Planning  • Interoperable Communications 
Prevent Mission 
Area 
• Information Collection and Threat 
Recognition 
• Intelligence Fusion and Analysis 
• Information Sharing and 
Collaboration 
• Terrorism Investigation and 
Apprehension 
• CBRNE Detection 
Protect Mission 
Area 
• Risk Analysis 
• Critical Infrastructure Protection 
• Food and Agriculture Safety and 
Defense 
• Public Health Epidemiological 
Investigation and Laboratory Testing 
• Citizen Preparedness and Participation 
Respond Mission 
Area 
• On-Site Incident Management 
• Emergency Operations Center 
Management 
• Critical Resource Logistics and 
Distribution 
• Volunteer Management and 
Donations 
• Worker Health and Safety 
• Public Safety and Security Response 
• Firefighting Operations/Support 
• WMD/Hazardous Incident Response 
Decontamination 
• Explosive Device Response 
Operations 
• Animal Health Emergency Support 
• Environmental Health and Vector 
Control 
• Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or 
In-Place Protection 
• Isolation and Quarantine 
• Search and Rescue 
• Emergency Public Information and 
Warning 
• Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment 
• Medical Surge 
• Medical Supplies Management and 
Distribution 
• Mass prophylaxis 
• Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and 
Related Services) 
• Fatality Management 
Recover Mission 
Area 
• Structural Damage Assessment and 
Mitigation 
• Restoration of Lifelines 
• Economic and Community Recovery 
Each capability is comprised of critical tasks and specific performance standards, 
depending on conditions.  The elements of capability defined in the document (p. 8) are 
described in Table 7.  These elements are similar to the preparedness elements OSLGCP 
(2004a) described in September 2004, but are now descriptions of elements to achieve 
missions and tasks.  For example, the previous “guidance” element described items such 
as strategies and plans, but the “planning” element emphasized policies, plans, and the 
like that are necessary to achieving mission and tasks. 
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Table 7. Elements of Capability 
Element Description 
Personnel Paid and volunteer staff who meet relevant qualification and certification standards 
necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks. 
Planning Collection and analysis of intelligence and information, and development of policies, 
plans, procedures, mutual aid agreements, strategies, and other publications that 
comply with relevant laws, regulations, and guidance necessary to perform assigned 
missions and tasks. 
Organization and 
Leadership 
Individual teams, an overall organizational structure, and leadership at each level in 
the structure that comply with relevant laws, regulations, and guidance necessary to 
perform assigned missions and tasks. 
Equipment and 
Systems 
Major items of equipment, supplies, facilities, and systems that comply with relevant 
standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks. 
Training Content and methods of delivery that comply with relevant training standards 





Exercises, self-assessments, peer-assessments, outside review, compliance 
monitoring, and actual major events that provide opportunities to demonstrate, 
evaluate, and improve the combined capability and interoperability of the other 
elements to perform assigned missions and tasks to standards necessary to achieve 
successful outcomes. 
 
According to OSLGCP (2005a), still to come are identifying the level of 
capabilities various types of jurisdictions should have for national preparedness.  For 
Fiscal Year 2006, the focus is on performance improvement for seven national priorities, 
with states and urban areas required to update their homeland security preparedness 
strategies for the seven national priorities.  For Fiscal Year 2007, critical risk-based 
priorities within the set of the 36 capabilities defined in the Target Capabilities List 
(OSLGCP 2005a, p. iv).  The final Goal and new Target Capabilities List are to be issued 
on October 1, 2005, and will include 1) readiness targets, priorities, standards for 
preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the nation’s overall 
level of preparedness.  The TCL will define levels of capability to address the impact for 
all scenarios.  As part of that process, DHS will 1) define specific responsibilities to 
develop and maintain capabilities among levels of government and 2) apportion 
responsibility among groups of jurisdictions, or tiers, with different target levels of 
capabilities based on differences in risk factors such as total population, population 
density, and critical infrastructure. 
Finally, at the end of April 2005, DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidance 
(OSLGCP 2005d).  The concise document stated its purpose as providing instructions 
and guidance on how to implement the Interim National Preparedness Goal.  It 
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summarized progress to date, including development of the Goal, use of capabilities-
based planning, use of the national planning scenarios, development of the universal task 
list and target capabilities list, and explained the national priorities, and set out a timeline 
for HSPD-8 implementation.  Scenarios were to be tailored to local conditions, with 
jurisdictions to identify other possible threats and hazards.  The guidance called for state 
working groups to develop a prioritized list of capabilities—specific to that state—and a 
risk determination for addressing the national priorities.  Expanded regional collaboration 
was to build national capabilities for major events.  Much of its focus is implementing the 
seven national priorities, with the targeting of capabilities to these priorities. 
This chapter’s description of DHS CBP implementation highlights both progress 
and difficulties encountered over the many months.  The model for the homeland security 
national preparedness goal and related capabilities is the Department of Defense’s CBP 
approach.  The next chapter describes the defense community’s approach and the 
components considered important for effective CBP implementation, followed by a 
comparison of the DHS approach and that of the defense community.  The comparison 
presents opportunities for improving the homeland security implementation of CBP. 
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V. DEFENSE COMMUNITY: CAPABILITIES-BASED 
PLANNING 
A. DEFENSE COMMUNITY CBP PROCESS 
The DoD CBP model used by DHS reflects allies’ adoption of CBP.  All member 
nations of the defense community’s Technical Cooperation Program (TCP)—Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States—are using the concept of 
capability as the basis for the long-term planning of future defense force structures (The 
Technical Cooperation Program 2004).  This chapter describes the defense community’s 
CBP process and components important for effective CBP implementation. 
Drawing on several sources (Kendall 2002; Pogue and Vallerand 2003; Kiefer 
2004a, 2004c; The Technical Cooperation Program 2004), CBP for the defense 
community can be defined as 
a competitive approach to create the right blend of plans, people, 
equipment, and activity—capabilities—with distinct asymmetric abilities 
useful across a broad spectrum of potential challenges and circumstances 
in different theaters against diverse foes while addressing uncertainty, risk, 
and resource choices. 
The central audience for CBP is the “combatant commander” who must achieve 
specific missions.  Accordingly, several key CBP elements are identified to meet the 
commander’s needs.  These elements are all integral to a mission capability package, 
described by Kiefer (2004a) as a mission statement consisting of a purpose (objectives, 
effects, end-state) and associated tasks linked to candidate resources.  He (2004a, 2004c) 
writes that central CBP elements include: 
• Capabilities.  A capability is the ability to achieve an effect to a standard 
under specified conditions through multiple combinations of means and 
ways to perform a set of tasks. 
• Tasks that make up each capability.  A task is an action or activity derived 
from mission analysis, doctrine, standard procedures, or concepts that may 
be assigned to an individual or organization. 
• Concepts of operations (CONOPS).  CONOPS is the overall picture and 
broad flow of tasks within a plan by which a commander maps capabilities 
to effects, and effects to an end-state for a specific scenario. 
• Mission.  The mission is the purpose (objectives and end-state) and tasks 
assigned to a commander. 
• Capability effects achieving a desired end-state.  A capability effect is a 
change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.  An end-state is the 
set of conditions, behaviors, and freedoms that defines achievement of the 
commander’s mission. 
• Measures.  A measure is the quantitative or qualitative basis for describing 
the quality of task performance. 
CBP is characterized by a straightforward decision-making process.  The 
Technical Cooperation Program (2004, p. 4) describes a generic process chart of CBP, 
shown in Figure 6, with similar elements and concepts seen in the Davis (2002) approach 
described earlier.  Under this process, CBP starts with overarching guidance, identifies 
capability gaps, explores options, and ends with an affordable investment plan. 
 










































Stage one in the process determines, as Taylor (2004) describes, “where are we?”  
The second stage determines what is to be done to address capability needs.  Taylor and 
The Technical Cooperation Program (2004) describe inputs to CBP as five major 
components.  These are 1) objectives that are the top-level strategic guidance that sets 
clear priorities, objectives to be associated with different scenarios, and planning 
assumptions, 2) context which is future allied and adversary capabilities, endorsed 
scenarios, and agreed upon operational concepts, 3) constraints such as cash flow, 
scheduling, and balancing capabilities, 4) a framework to collect input information for 
capability development and a capability partition scheme, and 5) force characteristics of 
current and planned force elements, including lessons learned. 
B.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPONENTS 
Drawing on these sources and other defense community CBP literature and 
presentations, the following sections present several components important for effective 
CBP implementation.  These are summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Components for Defense CBP Implementation 
Components Description 
Business Case for CBP Adoption Justify organizational commitment and investment 
Strategic, Cascading Policy Goals Use top-level government guidance that cascade goals into strategic 
policy and operational documents and into CBP. 
Stakeholder Ownership Ensure stakeholder involvement, collaboration, and perspective-
sharing. 




Design and implement CBP decision process that captures mission 
tasks and capabilities, their priority, how they relate, and solutions. 
Risk Assessment Approach Use risk assessment in the CBP management process to determine 
investments. 
Different Planning Horizons Incorporate different planning horizons into CBP to stage the 
development of capabilities. 
Mission-Based, Phased Scenarios Have the right scenarios on which to base planning and/or 
exercises. 
Capability Development and 
Standard Categories 
Provide guidelines to craft capabilities and develop standard 
capability categories that fully reflect what effects the capabilities 
should generate. 
Decision Rules for Lists Establish clear rules for the development of task lists and capability 
lists. 
CBP Evolution Evolve CBP depending on planning applications and developing 
maturity. 




1. Business Case for CBP Adoption 
As with any new approach, CBP adoption requires a strong business case to 
justify the organizational commitment and investment.  This is especially important given 
the transformational impact of CBP on organizational decision-making and the 
complexity of the approach.  In the defense communities, the strong business case for 
CBP adoption grew primarily out of the need to shift defense planning from a “threat-
based” model to a “capabilities-based” model (Department of Defense 2001).  Instead of 
planning for large conventional wars in a few distant theaters under the threat-based 
model, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review proposed identifying capabilities to deter 
and defeat adversaries that relied on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare 
(Department of Defense 2001). 
According to Schilling (2004), DoD has used threat-based planning since DoD 
instituted the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1962.  However, 
threat-based planning meant strong response to a few situations while largely ignoring all 
other potential challenges.  The result is that defense forces were created that may be 
limited in responding to changing conditions.  According to Davis (2003), DoD’s threat-
based approach and illustrative official planning scenarios for major theater wars served 
as specifications, defining necessary and sufficient characteristics of the force structure, 
thereby leading to consistent support of current programs.  The approach only considered 
conventional-wisdom threats and point-in-time versions of detailed scenarios, as though 
the circumstances of future conflict could be predicted. 
In the foreword to the Joint Operations Concepts (Department of Defense 2003), 
Secretary Rumsfeld said a capabilities-based approach would focus more on how the 
United States would defeat an adversary’s broad array of capabilities instead of 
identifying who the adversaries were and where they might threaten joint forces or 
United States’ interest.  According to Davis (2003), capabilities-based planning generates 
capabilities usable for different purposes and circumstances.  For each name-level 
scenario (for example, China invades a unified Korea), planners should evaluate 
capabilities for broad range of operational circumstances that would stress capabilities in  
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very different ways.  Dimensions might include political-military scenario details, 
objectives, strategies, tactics, forces, force effectiveness, environment, and other 
modeling assumptions. 
While addressing the limitations of threat-based planning was the primary 
business case for DoD’s adoption of CBP, other reasons existed.  For example, The 
Technical Cooperation Program (2004) said that CBP was developed as an attempt to 
break down traditional single-service stovepipes so that systems and concepts from 
multiple services could be used to achieve capabilities.  A joint focus encourages 
decision-makers to make capability decisions with broad defense force goals in mind 
instead of considering their own service.  CBP provides the means to compare different 
options for achieving the same capability and to do so in an integrated fashion.  Joint 
Staff/J-7 (2004), describing DoD’s previous requirements and acquisition process, said 
requirements often were developed, validated, and approved as stand-alone solutions to 
counter specific threats or scenarios, not as part of a system of elements.  As a result, 
systems integration was forced at the end of the process; duplication existed, particularly 
in smaller programs; spiral acquisition practices were not well institutionalized; and joint 
warfighting needs were not prioritized.  CBP, according to Taylor (2004), also links 
procurement decisions to strategic goals and provides an audit trail for accountability. 
More subtly, Kendall (2002) argues that the defense drawdown in the 1990s 
forced military services to develop capabilities intended to protect each service’s 
institutional functions and infrastructure while trying to structure the force.  In other 
words, attempts to protect force size drove threat-based planning.  CBP removes some of 
the “cover” for protecting force size by focusing on mission needs and effects, and 
competition among overall capability options. 
2. Strategic, Cascading Policy Goals 
While the business case provides the rationale and incentive for change in the 
strategic thrust of an organization, another component is establishing specific strategic 
policy goals.  What is needed for CBP, according to The Technical Cooperation Program 
(2004), are high-level capability objectives derived from top-level government guidance.  
These policy goals support the use of top-level doctrine or some overarching operational  
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concepts that consider the way a force will fight.  Moreover, these goals cascade into 
strategic policy and operational documents, and then into the CBP process and its 
planning outputs. 
For example, according to the Canada Department of National Defence (2002a), 
the foundation for Canada’s CBP was an early White Paper that defined governmental 
expectations, leading to a Strategy 2020 document that articulated the national defense 
vision.  In turn, the Canadian Forces concept of force employment was crafted to describe 
how the national defense vision would be delivered.  Force planning scenarios illustrated 
where and when the concept of employment would be applied, finally leading to 
Canada’s capability goals matrix and Canada Joint Task List (CJTL) for CBP.  In the 
United Kingdom, according to the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (2004), a 
defense white paper also set out the need to defend against future principal security 
challenges such as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
proliferation, and weak and failing states.  The Australia Department of Defence (2000) 
also relied on a white paper on the future of Australia’s defense force. 
A similar process occurred in DoD in planning for joint processes and in 
individual services.  DoD (2001) built its strategic framework to defend the nation and 
secure a viable peace around four defense policy goals—assuring allies and friends, 
dissuading future military competition, deterring threats and coercion against US 
interests, and if deterrence failed, decisively defeating any adversary.  These strategic 
policy goals are further defined in other documents.  For example, within DoD joint force 
decisionmaking, according to Joint Staff/J-7 (2004) and Kiefer (2004a), concepts (Joint 
Operations Concepts, Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint 
Integrating Concepts) are translated into a capability level of detail, often using a time 
frame of 10 to 20 years into the future.  Military judgment is applied to those concepts to 
validate what collection of attributes and measures are needed, and thus a standard for 
critical functional areas.  Current programs are mapped against that standard to compare 
current capabilities against the standard, propose alternatives, choose a specific 
capability, and then move that decision into the investment strategy. 
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3. Stakeholder Ownership 
A third component is ensuring stakeholder ownership, especially important for 
joint planning and operations.  The Technical Cooperation Program (2004) says that one 
of the first requirements for successful implementation of CBP is stakeholder 
involvement, described in collaborative terms.  Stakeholders generally control the 
information, resources, and authority required to support CBP, and their requirements 
must be considered from the outset.  Key stakeholders—those responsible for identifying 
and deploying the capability envelopes—will eventually control the CBP process, and it 
is important that they have ownership of it.  Each stakeholder should have an 
understanding of the perspectives of other stakeholders and an appreciation of different, 
if not competing, requirements.  For example, Taylor (2004) notes that CBP success 
requires engaging defense planners at all levels. 
As with other components, the decision-making process can help build in 
stakeholder ownership.  For example, the United States Air Force uses its decision 
process to secure “joint acceptance” of capability selections. 
4. Top Leader Ownership 
Another component is top leader support, involvement, and decision-making—
ownership—for the CBP process.  According to Kiefer (2004a), DoD’s Joint Integrating 
Concepts (Joint Concepts) are delivered with a detailed scenario, concept of operations 
(CONOPS), and a list of tasks with measures for a Functional Capabilities Board (Board) 
to a perform capabilities based assessment on each Joint Concept and perform a data call 
to services to match Joint Concept tasks to current, programmed, and planned systems. 
According to Joint Staff/J-7 (2004), each Board is a key decision-making body.  
Only the high-level Joint Requirements Operation Council can charter a Board.  The 
Boards ensure new capabilities are conceived and developed in a joint warfighting 
context and proposals are consistent with an integrated joint force.  They also organize, 
analyze, and prioritize capabilities proposals, oversee the development and updating of 
functional concepts, and ensure integrated architectures reflect the functional areas.  Each 
Board assesses the Joint Concept against the baseline scenario provided by the author, 
and then may run it against additional Defense planning scenarios to refine the conditions 
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and standards for each task and aggregate capability.  The CBP output is a weighted list 
of capability needs, gaps, and excesses. 
According to Feaga (2004), in 2000, the United States Air Force (USAF) began 
developing six CONOPs to support its contribution to the joint defense strategy.  All 
USAF operations, programming, and budget decisions in turn are designed to support the 
capabilities defined by the CONOPs.  Six new CONOPS divisions on the USAF Air Staff 
in the Operations Requirements Directorate were created to connect CBP around these 
CONOPS.  Each of the USAF’s six CONOPS has an assigned advocate called a 
Champion responsible for the capabilities the USAF has, or needs to develop.  The 
CONOPS Champions play a key role in mitigating risk throughout CONOPS 
development.  They are charged with overseeing the entire development process and for 
communicating issues to senior leadership.  CONOPS assessment and analysis is 
conducted by subject matter experts under the critical jurisdiction of each Champion.  
CONOPS Champions will integrate priorities among capabilities for review by the USAF 
corporate structure and participate in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council via 
USAF challenges.  Oversight action and challenges ensure all CONOPS capabilities are 
addressed at the Boards to help ensure all programs are jointly accepted. 
5. Specific Management Decision-Making Process 
Another component is a well-designed and implemented decision process for 
CBP.  This process should capture tasks and capabilities needed to carry out missions and 
their priority, how they relate, solutions to meet those needs, and allocation of resources.  
For example, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2004a), the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the Defense Acquisition System, and the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process form DoD’s three principle 
decision support processes to transform the military forces to support the National 
Military Strategy and the Defense Strategy.  According to Joint Staff/J-7 (2004) and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2004b), the JCIDS provides an enhanced methodology to identify 
and describe gaps and redundancies in capabilities, prioritize capability proposals, and 
improve collaboration with other departments and agencies.  The goal is to ensure that 
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the joint force has the capabilities necessary to perform across the range of military 
operations. 
JCIDS analysis begins with a Functional Area Analysis that identifies the 
operational tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve military objectives.  As 
input, it uses the national strategies, Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, 
Joint Integrating Concepts, Integrated Architectures, the Universal Joint Task List, and 
the anticipated range of broad capabilities that adversaries might employ.  Output 
consists of the tasks to be reviewed in the follow-on Functional Needs Analysis that 
assesses the ability of the current and programmed joint capabilities to accomplish the 
tasks that the functional area analysis identified, under the full range of operating 
conditions and in compliance with designated standards.  The needs analysis produces a 
list of capability gaps or shortcomings that require solutions and indicates the time frame 
in which those solutions are needed.  A Functional Solution Analysis follows, which is an 
operationally-based assessment of potential approaches to solving (or mitigating) one or 
more of the capability gaps (needs) identified in the Functional Needs Analysis. 
A capabilities review and risk assessment (CRRA) step following a functional 
needs analysis is the most important step for the Air Force, according to Feaga (2004).  In 
the CRRA, capability measures are developed from a variety of analysis tools such as 
current intelligence estimates, modeling and simulation, and wargaming.  Measures of 
effectiveness are assigned to all levels of required capabilities within a master capabilities 
list to score how well the USAF performs.  Scenarios are selected to assess the USAF’s 
ability to deliver effects needed.  Scenarios from the Defense planning scenarios are used 
and further refined by guidelines in the National Security Strategy and the National 
Military Strategy.  The scenarios also are modified by more demanding requirements 
known as stressors to craft broad spectrum capabilities.  Analysis determines a definition 
of problems and capability shortfalls, presented to USAF senior leadership for decision-
making and resource allocation. 
6. Risk Assessment Approach 
A sixth component is using risk assessment in the CBP management process.  A 
key tenet of CBP is addressing affordability and sustainability, which means that not all 
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capabilities can be deployed or maintained.  Affordability and sustainability requires 
addressing risk tolerances and priorities for capability development and deployment, and 
assessing capabilities and their impacts over time.  Taylor (2004) writes that balancing 
investments in CBP will require deletions and additions in elements such as force 
development as part of risk and priority setting. 
For example, the Department of Defense (2001) developed a broad approach to 
risk management intended to ensure the defense establishment is sized, shaped, postured, 
committed, and managed to accomplish defense policy goals.  Managing risk means 
changes in operating practices and military and civilian personnel systems, business 
practices, and infrastructure.  These dimensions reflect DoD’s experiences over the last 
decade in attempting to balance strategy, force structure, and resources.  The risk 
management framework gives DoD the ability to consider capability tradeoffs among 
fundamental objectives and fundamental resources constraints. 
The framework is made of four related dimensions: force management, 
operational, future challenges, and institutional.  Force management is the ability to 
recruit, retain, train, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the 
readiness of the force while accomplishing operational tasks.  Operational is the ability to 
achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency, with risk 
management considering not just additional force structure, but also assessing changes in 
capabilities, concepts of operations, and organizational designs to help reduce risk.  A 
future challenge is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational 
concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid-to long-term military challenges.  The last 
dimension is institutional, the ability to develop management practices and controls that 
use resources efficiently and promote the effective operation of the defense 
establishment. 
Periodic assessment of existing and planned capabilities is part of ongoing risk 
assessment.  The Technical Cooperation Program (2004) notes some nations that are 
practicing CBP will assess capabilities three or four times over an approximate 15-year 
period.  For example, the Canada Department of National Defence (2002a, p. 22) uses a 
capability goals matrix to rank capabilities.  There are four levels in the Canadian 
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matrix—military strategic, operational, and tactical, with the operational level divided to 
identify goals in the domestic and international context.  As is shown in Table 9, the 
capability areas are rated as to importance (high, medium, and low) to the Department of 
National Defence and the Canadian Forces to achieve their overarching defense mission. 
 
Table 9. Canada Capability Goals Matrix 
Command and Control Operations Level 
Command Info and 
Intel 
Conduct Mobility Protect 





High High Low High Low Low Medium High 
Operational 
(Domestic) 
High High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Operational 
(International) 
Medium Medium Low Low Low Medium Low Medium 
Tactical Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium High 
 
To reach high capability, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian 
Forces must be capable of exerting effective, unilateral defense ability in the majority of 
the applicable Canadian Joint Task List sub-tasks associated with that capability area.  
The capability must be high and unilateral because it cannot be delegated to another 
nation or because experience and strategic circumstances dictate that high is the 
minimum acceptable level for overall success and risk management. 
Medium level capability goals, less easily defined, are those where an effective 
capability in most of the applicable sub-tasks is considered important and may also result 
from a conscious decision to assume some risk in that capability area.  For example, the 
Canadian Forces need to conduct joint and combined operations effectively and possess 
interoperability with major allies.  Canada’s risk assessment considers joint and 
combined operations as separate concepts.  Jointness is the art of combining capabilities 
from different military services to create an effect that is greater than the sum of the parts.  
However, not all military functions or capabilities need to be joint: some will be 
combined. Canadian units more frequently will be combined—interoperate—with the 
units of another nation of similar capabilities, producing a larger formation and 
complementary capabilities coordinated in a specific situation.  Units may also need to 
assume a significant leadership role for medium capability goals, although this will not 
normally be necessary. 
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A low capability goal indicates a minimum level of capability, depending on a 
specific strategic situation or an assessment of benefits in seeking a higher capability 
level for an assigned defense mission compared to costs.  Under a low capability goal, 
Canadian units must be able to take part in joint or combined operations, but not assume 
a leadership role. 
7. Different Planning Horizons 
An additional component is incorporating different planning horizons into CBP to 
stage the development of capabilities, although Taylor (2004) observes CBP can be used 
against a single future time frame or set of timeframes.  Taylor also notes that timeframes 
should cover a sufficient span for action and changes to take effect, and then allow an 
assessment of risk over time. 
To illustrate, the Canada Department of National Defence (2002a) envisions three 
planning horizons, each with a different focus for CBP.  Horizon One is for a maximum 
of five years and seeks to deliver capability in already identified ways.  Horizon Two is 
for five to 15 years and focuses on delivering already identified capabilities in better 
ways.  Horizon Three is for 10 to 30 years and determines if capabilities are needed in the 
anticipated future, in addition to exploring radically new ways of delivering capabilities.  
The time period is deliberately overlapping for Horizons Two and Three. 
Canada describes the first horizon as the most detailed because it executes an 
already developed plan and shapes near term program aspects.  It requires detailed 
programming of resources, determining if plans are unfolding as required, and 
developing the appropriate level of capability.  The second horizon optimizes how best to 
do what already is generally understood and ensure that introducing a more effective way 
of delivering a known capability transitions seamlessly into the more detailed plans from 
Horizon One.  The third horizon is the most challenging as it deals with introducing 
fundamental changes in the way a capability will be delivered and determining what 
developments promise to deliver the future necessary capabilities. 
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense (2001) describes the need for a two-
pronged view of implementing CBP—maintaining a military advantage in key areas 
while developing new areas of military advantage and denying asymmetric advantages to 
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adversaries.  Thus, it entails adapting existing military capabilities to new circumstances, 
while experimenting with the development of new military capabilities.  More 
specifically, Kiefer (2004a, 2004c) describes force development planning as solving 
future capabilities by asking what top-down investment guidance is needed to address 
future strategic challenges.  Force development decisions also consider what DoD can 
provide in achievable technologies and methods of the future force.  In contrast, force 
employment decisions involve planning for today’s events, such as strategic decisions as 
to how best manage and posture DoD assets to support national interests and mitigate 
risks. 
8. Mission-Based, Phased Scenarios 
The eighth component is having the right scenarios on which to base planning 
and/or exercises.  Taylor (2004) and The Technical Cooperation Program (2004) stress 
that defense capability should be assessed using plausible situations encapsulated in 
planning scenarios.  These scenarios provide the context of CBP and should cover the full 
spectrum of military activities.  The scenarios help develop realistic capability goals and 
the provision of a defense force meeting government requirements at a minimum cost.  In 
addition, as mentioned earlier, scenarios should provide a series of time frames to 
facilitate capability assessment through time as part of risk assessment, rather than at a 
single arbitrary point in the future.  Scenarios also should be used in combination to 
assess simultaneous operations. 
Scenario types can be on a spectrum, ranging from real world planning scenarios 
to generic scenarios.  Whichever type of scenarios are used, the scenarios should reflect 
the type of tasks that the government may want its defense force to undertake.  In 
addition, scenarios used for CBP should be common across the defense force and detailed 
enough so that re-interpretation of the scenario does not occur. 
Gori, Chen, and Pozgay (2004) write that Australia uses one or more strategic 
scenarios to identify a capability requirement and then operational scenarios determine 
the operational requirements for a proposed capability.  Strategic scenarios represent 
strategically endorsed scenarios, high-level descriptions of situations with a brief history 
of preceding events and their context.  Each scenario typically will describe a conflict 
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situation, an opposing force, a military setting, a theatre of operations and the events 
leading up to the conflict situation.  They specify the international setting and the 
attitudes of allies, allies of the enemy and neutrals.  They also detail the political aims of 
the Australian government and its military strategic objectives.  All strategic scenarios, 
taken together, in principle largely define overall defense requirements. 
Australia’s strategically derived operational scenarios are reference scenarios that 
have been extended from strategic scenarios, to provide sufficient detail for rigorous 
evaluation and descriptions of defense requirements for and use of capabilities.  One 
scenario example is evicting an enemy from an overseas territory with phases 
representing the buildup, the establishment of sea and air dominance, lodgement, the 
tactical battle, and the post-battle phase.  The Australian operational scenarios are more 
detailed extensions of the strategic scenarios, often detailing a force structure with 
equipped capabilities to be applied to achieve the particular mission.  Strategic and 
operational scenarios form a link between strategic planning, futures analysis, 
experimentation, capability development, force development, contingency planning and 
preparedness. 
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (2004) builds in what it calls 
“concurrency” in its use of scenarios for force structure development.  The Ministry of 
Defense establishes what is needed for a particular operational scenario and then maps 
the conclusions against a number of operations that should be conducted at any one time.  
For example, the United Kingdom should be able to respond to a medium scale operation 
at the same time as an enduring small scale operation and a one time small scale 
intervention operation. 
The Canada Department of National Defence (2002a) uses operational research 
tools in a scenario operational capability risk assessment model to identify how often 
different types of capabilities are called upon in the scenarios.  While there are arguments 
for using a broad range of scenarios in CBP to thoroughly test force structure for a wide 
range of situations, the Department of National Defence argues for a small number.  The 
Department believes that while a more comprehensive list of scenarios may theoretically 
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add more precision to the force planning process, they may not as there are so many 
uncertainties. 
9. Capability Development and Standard Categories 
A ninth component is providing guidelines to craft capabilities and develop 
standard capability categories that fully reflect what effects the capabilities should 
generate.  For example, the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 2004c) provides guidelines to craft capability descriptions, saying (pp. 4-
5) they must indicate 1) what the capability is to do, such as “track” or “determine,” 2) 
identify a target or subject, such as a person on a battlefield, 3) the size or range of the 
subject, such as a large vessel, 4) the domain of the target systems, such as air-breathing 
targets, 5) the area of action, and 6) the range to area, or the distance over which effects 
must be made or action taken.  Capabilities are seen as the end of a “waterfall” of lower 











Figure 7.   Battlespace Awareness Waterfall Example 
Mission
Major joint operating concept
Task
Major activity within the joint 
operating concept
Sub-task
Discreet portion of the task 
accomplished on a contiguous part 
of the battlespace
Drivers
Technical or operational issues 
that drive the solution to the sub-
task (the hard challenge)
Capability
The desired ability which 
satisfies the driver, and 
encourages the 




Support securing of 
public areas/sites
Support prevention of 
violent/illegal activity
Potential triggers of 
spontaneous outbreaks, 
outsider threats, insider threats
Observe activities at site, gather 
information from trusted 
personnel, infiltrate potentially 
belligerent factions, radiological 
detection capability
 
Regarding categories, The Technical Cooperation Program (2004) recommends 
using standard groupings such as capability clusters or capability partitions to make the 
CBP process more manageable.  There are many ways to define the boundaries between 
capability partitions.  These partitions are based on the ability to perform tasks, or to 
deliver effects, such as the control and denial of underwater battle space.  A key enabler 
for successful CBP is getting the partitions agreed to by the key stakeholders and account 
for synergies and dependencies across partitions.  Taylor (2004) cautions that the 
capability partitions should not be aligned to inappropriate organizations.  If they are 
aligned, than organizational stovepiping is encouraged. 
Kiefer (2004c) defines at least two fundamental military capability categorization 
options that can be used independently or in combination.  One is functional or means-
focused.  These capabilities would include battlespace awareness, command and control, 
logistics, and force management.  Another option is operational or ends-focused.  
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Operational categories might include strategic deterrence, homeland defense, civil 
support, and land combat operations.  Each category then would be further defined. To 
illustrate, force management would include force employment and force deployment. 
Homeland defense would include capabilities such as continuity of operations, securing 
domestic approaches and territory, and population protection. 
The defense communities have taken similar approaches to capability 
categorization.  For example, as described by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 
(2003, 2004), military tasks provide a framework for detailed defense planning for the 
size, shape, and capabilities of the Unied Kingdom’s Armed Forces.  The military tasks 
reflect the broad types of tasks and operations in which the United Kingdom is likely to 
be involved and then provide an output-focused framework for developing force structure 
requirements.  The 18 military tasks are in the four areas of 1) standing strategic 
commitments, such as nuclear deterrent and strategic intelligence gathering, 2) standing 
home commitments, such as security at home in support of other government 
departments, 3) standing overseas commitments, such as commitments to international 
alliances and partners, and 4) contingent operations overseas, such as humanitarian 
assistance and peace support operations.  Military capability is divided into six key 
capability elements, such as maritime, land, and logistics.  The Canada Department of 
National Defence (2002a) divides military tasks into eight capability areas, such as 
Command, Information and Intelligence, and Corporate Policy and Strategy. 
10. Decision Rules for Lists 
In another component, the defense communities establish clear rules for the 
development of task lists and capability lists.  These rules include the source for 
compiling the lists, what criteria will be used in selecting candidates for the list, and how 
they should be arrayed.  For example, Kiefer (2004b) notes that the universal joint task 
list for DoD’s CBP is the result of 14 years of spiral development.  He (2004c) says many 
sources of information from the task list to individual service sources to interagency 
information regarding tasks, conditions, and standards are being filtered for DoD’s 
universal capability library.  The library structure consists of a capability library—a  
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master database of capabilities linked to current, planned, and roadmapped forces, units, 
and equipment—and a task library.  The task library is the master database of all 
doctrinal and conceptual tasks. 
The Australia Department of Defence (2003) has followed several principles for 
designing its Australian Joint Essential Tasks (Joint Tasks): joint, enduring, essential, and 
containing relevant and current content.  Joint tasks are those that require the contribution 
of two or more forces working together to achieve the desired outcome.  Essential tasks 
are required for the conduct of an operation.  Enduring tasks capture how the Australian 
Defense Force operates currently and might undertake joint operations in the future.  
Essential tasks capture what are required for the conduct of an operation.   
In addition to the design principles, Australia Department of Defence (2003) has 
set two further design goals for future Joint Task development—uniqueness and 
hierarchical.  For any given level of command, a task only appears once in the task 
hierarchy.  No tasks should be duplicated although some related tasks might appear in 
more than one place.  The requirement for uniqueness is analogous to the United States’ 
UJTL requirement that tasks be mutually exclusive, that is, that any task performed by 
any joint organization or service unit will fit into only one place in the task structure.  
Thus common tasks were abstracted out of their natural parent task and were grouped 
together. 
In addition, the Joint Tasks, similar to other defense agencies, are intended to 
maintain a hierarchical structure.  For a high level task, its subordinate tasks, taken 
together, comprehensively define all of the activities in the higher-level task.  For 
example, the Australian Joint Tasks and Canada’s joint task list have three levels of joint 
tasks—strategic, operational, and tactical.  The tasks within each level are further 
disaggregated into two additional layers of sub-tasks with each layer more detailed and 
specific. 
However, opinions differ about hierarchical and uniqueness design for the lists.  
For example, Kiefer (2004c) recommends that, at least for DoD, hierarchies should not be 
imposed because these require preconceived notions about what criteria are more 
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valuable or useful for segregating data.  He also notes that hierarchies require frequent 
changes or alternate versions of lists.  Further, he recommends that mutual exclusivity 
should not be required, at least at the operational level.  His point is that no real force, 
unit, equipment, or system falls entirely within any one category. 
11. CBP Evolution 
Another component is evolving CBP depending on planning applications and 
maturity.  Each defense organization used as an example in this paper is in various stages 
of implementing CBP, both on a national joint and individual service level.  However, 
each organization has tailored CBP and taken a staged approach to implementation.  For 
example, as described by the Australia Department of Defence (2003), allied CBP 
approaches are similar, but emphasize different outcomes over time: 
• The United Kingdom has primarily focused on immediate operations and 
long term planning.  The United Kingdom has used a list of essential joint 
tasks as an analysis tool for exercises with more recent efforts to integrate 
the tasks into mission analysis and operational planning. 
• Canada’s tasks are closely linked into force planning scenarios and future 
planning and are used in joint department structuring so each department 
uses the same criteria for operations and to translate tasks into capability.  
Canada uses its joint task list for force employment and capability 
development and has developed 11 force planning scenarios to link their 
capability development and planning. 
• The United States joint task list has aided in the development of planning 
requirements for joint exercises since 1993.  The joint task list was 
developed specifically for training but is now linked into readiness and 
preparedness reporting and capability development. 
CBP also will progress at a different pace in the organization, creating different 
levels of maturity overall.  Thus, some capabilities needed for the defense community of 
a nation may be delayed compared to others.  The Canada Department of National 
Defence (2002a) points out that over time CBP improves commonality among defense 
planners by introducing a common way of describing and discussing capability elements.  
As the different national defense organizations in Canada adopt the common 
terminology, it becomes easier to link different plans providing various capability 
components.  In the beginning, certain plans will be more mature or more vital for 
integrated planning.  Canada’s long-term plan for major equipment is the most mature in 
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employing CBP.  The development of long-term plans for personnel resources, research, 
concepts, information technology and infrastructure is likely necessary before more 
encompassing capability planning can be done in Canada. 
12. CBP Enablers 
The last component is additional organizational and cultural enablers for effective 
CBP adoption.  These are other necessary and sufficient factors, which along with 
components already mentioned, such as stakeholder ownership, create and sustain the 
environment for implementation.  Many practitioners and students of CBP have 
highlighted considerations for CBP design and deployment that cover a wide range of 
factors, from mindset changes to the practicalities of resourcing CBP planning and 
execution. 
Davis and Jenkins (2002) write that CBP’s complexity requires a passion for 
adaptiveness and substantial analysis leading to a combination of incentives, standards, 
and policies for CBP.  They cite the need for major studies on how to modify economic 
and other incentives to encourage more adaptive and recoverable systems.  Feaga (2004) 
recommends developing new languages in risk management and effects once it is known 
what capability proficiency and sufficiency levels are needed.  Gori, Chen, and Pozgay 
(2004), writing about the Australian experience, indicate attention is needed to address 
conflicting processes, the lack of suitable analytical tools, excessively prescriptive 
requirements, and the recognition of functional linkages and dependencies between 
related capabilities. 
Similarly, the Department of Defense (2003) recommends a broad and long-term 
strategic perspective, a greater appreciation of the operational and strategic 
environmental factors, and a rigorous analysis of the capabilities needed to achieve 
defense policy goals.  The Technical Cooperation Program (2004) lists the need for 
consistent cost estimates and resource provision for both the development and execution 
of the CBP process.  Moreover, joint force personnel will require a joint and 
expeditionary “mindset” reflecting a greater level of deployability and versatility to avoid 
organizational stovepiping.  Canada’s Department of National Defence (2002a) identifies 
the challenge of developing and maintaining capabilities to conduct operations 
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independently in domestic situations and alongside alliance and coalition partners for 
international obligations.  Canada believes the focus must remain on combat-capable 
units because these units can be employed in other security activities, such as 











































































VI. HOMELAND SECURITY CBP OBSERVATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters highlighted CBP concepts and approaches, a description of 
the DHS adoption of CBP for HSPD-8 requirements, and the defense community’s 
experiences and identification of key CBP components.  This chapter broadly assesses 
the DHS approach against the defense community’s components and identifies potential 
issues for homeland security’s CBP process in creating the national preparedness goal.  
Finally, it discusses difficulties in transferring the practicing defense community 
components to homeland security and provides additional comments for improvement not 
directly assessed as part of the CBP component analysis. 
B. COMPARISONS 
Table 10 summarizes general observations of DHS progress when compared to 
the defense community components. 
 
Table 10. DHS Progress and the Defense Components 
Components DHS Progress 
Business Case for CBP Adoption:  Justify 
organizational commitment and investment 
Business case stated in terms of national preparedness in 
HSPD-8 and now in legislation; clear business case still 
to be made for adopting CBP. 
Strategic, Cascading Policy Goals:  Use top-
level government guidance that cascade goals 
into strategic policy and operational documents 
and into CBP. 
Multiple sources of policy goals including national 
strategies, HSPD-8 and other presidential directives, the 
National Response Plan, and the National Incident 
Management System; integrated, single-source policy 
document for homeland security and national 
preparedness not yet available. 
Stakeholder Ownership:  Ensure stakeholder 
involvement, collaboration, and perspective-
sharing. 
Inconsistent attention paid to state and local entities as 
primary stakeholders; primarily federal approach used in 
consultation with, not collaboration with those entities.  
Private sector stakeholders yet to be closely involved. 
Top Leader Ownership:  Ensure top leader 
support, involvement, and decision-making. 
Federal leadership within DHS appears supportive; top 
leadership from other stakeholders still evolving.  
Decision-making processes not transparent and 
apparently fragmented. 
Specific Management Decision-Making 
Process:  Design and implement CBP decision 
process that captures mission tasks and 
capabilities, their priority, how they relate, 
solutions, and resource allocation. 
Process has evolved over time but is not formally 
structured with clear responsibilities, decision-making 
roles, and integration into stakeholders strategic 
planning, budgeting, program evaluation, and corrective 
action.  Interim documents extend the process. 
Risk Assessment Approach:  Use risk 
assessment in the CBP management process to 
Risk assessment is not well-defined and presented as an 
integral part of DHS CBP decision-making similar to the 
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Components DHS Progress 
determine investments. defense communities. 
Different Planning Horizons:  Incorporate 
different planning horizons into CBP to stage 
the development of capabilities. 
No expression of planning horizons to date; DHS has 
promised to evolve CBP and planning horizons may be 
part of the evolvement. 
Mission-Based, Phased Scenarios: Have the 
right scenarios on which to base planning 
and/or exercises 
Selection of 15 scenarios for planning; concern the 
scenarios are much too focused on terrorism in contrast 
to a clearer all-hazards approach and do not include 
different timeframes, including very long term. 
Capability Development and Standard 
Categories:  Provide guidelines to craft 
capabilities and develop standard capability 
categories that fully reflect what effects the 
capabilities should generate. 
Limited guidance on how to develop capabilities; 
capability categories still in process; no clear direction 
provided as to what is the best way to structure the 
capabilities for use by most entities. 
Decision Rules for Lists:  Establish clear rules 
for the development of task lists and capability 
lists. 
Rules for development not explicit; changing categories 
and elements. 
CBP Evolution:  Evolve CBP depending on 
planning applications and developing maturity. 
Policy timeframes have precluded a more evolutionary 
approach to CBP and addressing differing maturity in 
capability areas. 
CBP Enablers:  Consider organizational and 
cultural enablers to support CBP adoption. 
Enablers may be recognized but have not been 
adequately addressed; process characterized by rapid 
spiral development with extremely limited timeframes 
for consideration. 
 
1. Business Case for CBP Adoption 
The defense community experience suggests the adoption of CBP requires a 
strong business case to justify the organizational commitment and investment, such as 
flexibility in addressing current and future adversaries and their strategies.  For homeland 
security, the business case is stated in terms of national preparedness in HSPD-8 and now 
in legislation for measurable readiness priorities and targets.  However, as the DHS 
experience shows, much more work is needed to make the case for CBP as the right 
approach to implement HSPD-8.  The business case is particularly important given the 
complexity and the skills required for implementing and sustaining CBP over time across 
many organizations and for many different contingencies.  Moreover, there remains 
confusion as to whether the focus is primarily counter-terrorism, with all-hazards a 
secondary emphasis. 
2. Strategic, Cascading Policy Goals 
Specific policy goals, derived from top-level government guidance, should 
cascade into strategic policy and operational documents, and then into the CBP process 
and its planning outputs.  For homeland security, there are multiple sources of policy 
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goals including national homeland security-related strategies, HSPD-8 and other 
presidential directives, federal agency strategic plans, regulations and policy guidance, 
the National Response Plan, and the National Incident Management System.  In large 
part, these are statements of federal perspectives because no clear mechanism exists to 
produce top-level “national” guidance that is accepted and applicable across all levels of 
government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.  Unlike what 
appears to be the case in the defense communities, these various federally-developed 
national policy documents stand alone.  They have not been systematically integrated into 
a cohesive policy whole.  That may be the role envisioned for the national preparedness 
goal and related guidance, but its current construction will not meet that need.  In some 
cases, there are conflicting objectives and requirements across the policy documents.  A 
single-source policy document for homeland security and national preparedness is not yet 
available.  One is needed. 
3. Ownership of Stakeholders 
Involvement of stakeholders is critical in because they generally control the 
information, resources, and authority required to support CBP.  The defense community 
experience shows that the stakeholders should own the process and take responsibility for 
its use and outputs.  For homeland security, DHS has attempted to involve stakeholders 
such as state and local government officials, national associations, and other federal 
agencies involved in homeland security.  However, this involvement has been more 
characteristic of a consultative relationship rather than a partnering, collaborative 
relationship marked by ownership of CBP.  Given tight timeframes to meet HSPD-8 
objectives and perhaps even its requirement for federal development in consultation with 
others, the DHS response has been primarily to develop complex CBP material with 
limited stakeholder involvement.  The consultative process relies more on reaction and 
requirements for rapid comment from stakeholders than partnership in developing the 
CBP approach.  The end result has been “push back” from key stakeholders, confusion 




4. Top Leader Ownership 
The defense community experience demonstrates that top leadership support, 
involvement, and decision-making are critical to CBP success.  For defense, support has 
truly started at the top of cabinet departments and ministries and been sustained.  Top 
military and civilian officials are responsible for CBP and are held accountable for its 
operation.  In contrast, while federal leadership within DHS appears supportive; top 
leadership involvement, and even the means to secure top leader ownership from other 
stakeholders, is still a work in progress for homeland security CBP.  Decision-making 
processes are not transparent and, at least in the early stages of CBP adoption, appear 
fragmented among various DHS groups and organizations at lower authority levels. 
5. Specific Management Decision-Making Process 
The defense community experience also indicates another element for success is a 
well-designed and implemented decision process for CBP.  This process should capture 
tasks and capabilities needed to carry out missions and their priority, how they relate, and 
solutions for meeting those needs.  Homeland security, however, does not yet have a 
process similar, for example, to DoD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System.  The homeland security CBP process at this point is not formally structured with 
clear responsibilities, decision-making roles, defined steps and expected inputs and 
outputs, and melding into formal organizational planning, budgeting, and procurement 
decisions.  It is not clear how CBP will be seamlessly integrated with existing 
management approaches for government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
private sector companies.  The linkage from results expectations to budgeting is 
particularly problematic, for funders such as board of directors, city councils, state 
legislatures, and Congress must accept and act on CBP’s analytical framework and its 
products for decision-making. 
Moreover, developing mission capability packages for homeland security will 
require extensive collaboration and the combination of capabilities across stakeholders, 
no matter the source of funding.  It is unclear how that will be accomplished through 
current disparate management systems.  Finally, DHS has relied on a series of interim 
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documents that are not complete, further complicating and extending decision-making 
processes. 
6. Risk Assessment Approach 
The defense community experience pointed out that risk assessment is part of the 
CBP management process.  Risk assessment addresses affordability and sustainability, 
and thus risk tolerances and priorities for capability development and deployment and 
their impacts over time.  Assessment of risk is built into scenarios, capabilities review, 
and a consideration of benefits and costs.  Measurement systems are viewed as very 
important.  Other than scenario development and directions for states and localities to 
consider what is appropriate for their jurisdictions, risk assessment is not well-defined 
and presented as an integral part of homeland security CBP decision-making.  Measures 
and evaluation systems are still in development.  Moreover, it will be difficult to develop 
and implement regional approaches where core capabilities can be supported and 
supplemented by other jurisdictions in the region.  Political considerations may 
encourage jurisdictions to have a complete set of core preparedness activities rather than 
rely on other entities.  As a result, many jurisdictions will be engaged in parallel activities 
within their own risk decisions, and there may be little opportunity to learn from one 
another or share resources as part of an overarching risk management approach. 
7. Different Planning Horizons 
The defense community incorporates different planning horizons into CBP to 
stage the development of capabilities for the near, medium, and long term.  The 
homeland security approach at this stage does not appear to have any similar expression 
of planning horizons.  The 15 homeland security planning scenarios address an event in 
the “here and now” (bombings and bioterrorism) with an emphasis on national priorities.  
DHS has promised to constantly assess and change CBP and thus the needed planning 
horizons may yet be addressed.  However, lack of attention to capabilities for varying 
horizons may result in implementing capabilities that may be appropriate next year, but 
not five years from now.  The result is poor investment portfolio planning and creating 
capabilities that may be obsolete or require extensive updating in a short time period.  
The focus on national priorities may obscure or delay an emphasis on more valued 
planning horizons that anticipate possible future scenarios. 
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8. Mission-Based, Phased Scenarios 
The defense community emphasizes that defense capability should be assessed by 
using plausible situations in planning scenarios to cover the full spectrum of military 
activities.  In addition, scenarios used for CBP should be common across the defense 
force and detailed enough so that re-interpretation of the scenario does not occur.  Many 
state and local officials are concerned that the national planning scenarios focus too much 
on terrorism and, as mentioned above, the scenarios do not include different timeframes, 
including very long term. 
The homeland security CBP approach makes the assumption that preparing for 
terrorist events, representing the vast majority of the planning scenarios, will prepare 
jurisdictions for all-hazards events.  Many would argue that it might make more sense to 
develop capabilities for more probable all-hazards that can be “ramped up” for large-
scale terrorist events or large-scale natural or non-intentional human-caused disasters.  As 
a result, capabilities would cover a full spectrum of homeland security activities.  
Capabilities then could be scaled to what is affordable and sustainable (and more likely to 
be used) at the state and local level, and then supplemented by regional and/or federal 
capabilities if an event overwhelms those capabilities.  This approach anticipates that in 
most catastrophic situations, even a full complement of capabilities at the local or 
regional level will be quickly overcome. 
9. Capability Definition and Standard Categories 
The defense community experiences indicate that an important component is 
providing guidance on crafting capability descriptions and developing standard capability 
categories fully reflecting what effects the capabilities should generate.  DHS policies 
and guidance do generically define a capability, but guidance is lacking as to how to craft 
a capability description.  The homeland security capability categories should be agreed to 
by key stakeholders and account for interrelationships across the capability categories. 
At present, there does not appear to be a clear sense and rationale as to the best 
way to partition the homeland security capabilities for use by most entities.  The task list 
categories, still in draft, initially indicated capabilities will reflect primarily an indirect 
organizational categorization—federal, state, and local responsibilities, and then later on 
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those for the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens.  This may have 
created organizational stovepiping of capabilities, which the defense community 
cautioned against.  The latest draft documents use “mission areas” for emphasis—
prevention, protection, response, and recover.  The IED prototype uses mission areas with 
critical tasks drawn from the organizational tasks lists, adding to the confusion of what 
categories are in play or may be the final form.  The categorization across task lists and 
capability areas should be clarified, justified, and stabilized. 
10. Decision Rules for Lists 
The defense communities establish clear rules for the development of task lists 
and capability lists, such as uniqueness and hierarchy.  For homeland security, publicly 
available documents indicate a lack of explicit rules for decision-making.  Explicit 
decision rules should help the further development and revision of the detailed and 
lengthy lists over time.  For example, a rule regarding uniqueness would ensure 
developers would independently assess each task and whether its description is similar to 
or actually part of another task. 
11. CBP Evolution 
Another defense community component is evolving CBP to reflect planning 
applications.  CBP also will progress at a different pace in different parts of the 
organization, creating different levels of maturity.  For homeland security, current policy 
timeframes have precluded a more evolutionary approach to CBP and imposed extremely 
limited turnaround time for stakeholder comments on various draft products.  DHS does 
plan to keep enhancing the approach, but it will be very hard to dismantle earlier 
structures once the homeland security grant process “institutionalizes” around capability 
categories and tiered requirements.  A comprehensive CBP system is expected to be up 
and running in a timeframe of months.  While adoption initially will be based on one 
scenario—explosive devices—for initial planning, federal funding guidance indicates that 
in less than two years, all scenarios will be part of state and local planning.  In addition, 
the CBP as currently being adopted does not directly address differing maturity in 
capability areas that may impede overall progress in homeland security preparedness. 
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12. CBP Enablers 
The last component from the defense experience is additional organizational and 
cultural enablers for effective CBP adoption.  The defense experience indicates many 
facilitative factors come into play for effective CBP, many analytical and skill-based, but 
others such as incentives, the rationality of processes, and a deliberative approach.  For 
homeland security, enablers such as these may be recognized but have not been 
adequately addressed, perhaps because they are the difficult “softer” issues or the 
assumption is that they will be dealt with by stakeholders individually.  In addition, the 
rapid spiral development process has forestalled more careful consideration of CBP and 
what is needed to support its successful implementation. 
C. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS 
For virtually every component, the DHS progress falls short of the components 
that the defense community indicates are important to CBP implementation success.  
Many of the difficulties described in Chapter IV might have been avoided or mitigated if 
these components had been addressed.  For example, a clear business case might have 
encouraged stakeholder support early in the process.  A specific management decision-
making process would have better defined homeland security mission needs, priorities, 
and linkages to performance-based budgeting.  Different planning horizons would have 
phased the building of capabilities.  Attention to organizational and culture enablers 
would have also furthered CBP adoption. 
The next chapter builds on these observations to discuss factors impacting the 
success in further adopting the defense community components to homeland security. 
 
 71
VII. CONSTRAINTS ON CBP COMPONENT TRANSFERABILITY 
TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. KEY FACTORS 
In earlier chapters, this thesis has presented the defense community CBP 
experiences as good practices recommended for homeland security.  Bardach (2000), 
commenting on adopting good practices from outside an organization, observed that one 
has to ask if the good practice will work in the new organizational context.  With that in 
mind, four key factors differentiate homeland security and the national defense mission 
that may constrain transferability of CBP practices. 
1. Mission Scope and Coverage 
A first constraint is mission related.  In defense, the mission scope is more clearly 
defined for national defense, most often military action and civil support.  While many 
rightly argue that the national defense mission has broadened considerably in recent 
years, for homeland security, the mission is arguably broader for prevention, vulnerability 
reduction, and response and recovery responsibilities.  Actions are required at home and 
abroad, from dealings with individual citizens to negotiations with nation-states as border 
protection is extended overseas.  Homeland security also stresses all-hazards 
preparedness, requiring attention to a wide range of events, from small-scale earthquakes 
to catastrophic terrorist events.  CBP should allow homeland security to consider these 
multiple and diverse missions, the common and unique capabilities they require, and 
what tradeoffs in priorities and resourcing might be necessary. 
In addition, the defense experiences emphasize full mission coverage.  At 
present, it is not clear if the homeland security CBP approach is emphasizing prevention 
and deterrence.  While draft DHS task lists have included prevention efforts such as 
intelligence development and providing strategic and threat intelligence, the task lists 
focus much more attention on vulnerability reduction and response and recovery.  
Emergency response—after an event—appears to take the lion’s share of analysis and 
preparation with clear emphasis on first responder roles and responsibilities. 
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The constrained homeland security mission scope and coverage may be the result 
of several factors.  Gilman (2004) observed that there has been a major DHS focus on 
weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and not on all hazards and events that happen 
all that time, such as explosions.  Prevention has been “under the radar screen” for DHS 
as it might be considered the purview of other agencies, such as the Department of Justice 
or the Central Intelligence Agency, or state and local law enforcement officials.  In 
addition, DHS’s Office of Domestic Preparedness has had a mission of emergency 
management, not other aspects of homeland security, and it would be normal to see this 
office maximize its area of strength or understanding.  Perhaps more importantly, since 
September 11, first responders have been front and center, their needs expounded, and the 
results in terms of new equipment and capabilities much more visible. 
2. Organizational Perspectives 
A second constraint involves organizational perspectives.  One perspective is a 
federal department versus a national view.  The defense community normally contains 
decisions within a cabinet department and White House sphere, with input from other 
federal agencies and to a lesser extent, international partners.  In contrast, homeland 
security is presented as national in scope, not a federal responsibility of primarily just one 
executive department or agency.  A national perspective requires a much more 
collaborative approach, particularly in a federalist system and a fairly clear distinction 
between public and private spheres.   
Moreover, even within the federal homeland security establishment there is 
fragmentation.  Federal agencies other than DHS can act autonomously, buoyed by their 
own sources of support and direction.  Even when collaborative decisions are made, the 
vehicles for enforcement are very limited or unwanted.  The homeland security 
organizations represent different disciplines and perspectives, levels of public, private, 
and nongovernmental organizations, and even horizontal relationships such as the 
involvement of different federal, state, or local cabinet agencies.  Defense has a central 
core of military services that perform its activities that share a common culture and 
perspective to support and deploy the warfighter.  CBP should allow homeland security 
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to change its unit of analysis from organizations and requirements to capabilities and 
their delivery. 
In addition, chain of command and exercise of authority are different.  Defense 
normally has a top-down command and control structure with a highly disciplined 
attention to authority.  The homeland security CBP approach at present does not 
adequately guide analysis when assets and capabilities to accomplish a mission are not 
under one jurisdiction, may be unknown, or may ebb and flow over time.  The draft 
national preparedness rating scheme indicates that a group of organizations can be rated 
collaboratively under a mutual aide or an assistance compact to perform prevention, 
response, or recovery tasks for a specific scenario. 
For CBP, it is crucial that relationships are driven by strategic alliances among 
equal partners where all stakeholders—strategic partners—are identified, their needs 
clearly represented in collaborative decision-making, and incentives provided for 
decisions to not unravel.  Capability planning is always tied to sustainability analyses and 
funding support favors multiple-use capabilities and multiple sources of capabilities to 
reduce the funding burden on any one organization.  Additional work is needed to better 
understand how to apply the framework where there are networks of organizations that 
work homeland security issues or are discrete sets of organizations that handle specific 
homeland security functions.  Contingency planning is necessary in the event individual 
organizations or sectors will not meet their capability obligations.  This will be even more 
important when the CBP framework is expanded to address private sector and 
nongovernmental organizations who are critical players in prevention, vulnerability 
reduction, and response and recovery strategies and actions. 
3. Resource Development and Leveraging 
A third constraint is the resources that can be brought to bear for homeland 
security in contrast to the defense community.  To start, resource leveraging requires the 
understanding of assets that compose capabilities and in general what they can 
accomplish.  Capabilities include a diverse selection of elements, such as plans, 
procedures, personnel, equipment, and activities.  Defense organizations have paid 
considerable attention to the assets that can be combined for capabilities, where they are 
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deployed, what their maintenance or skill condition is, and when they will become 
obsolete or require renewal.  This is not yet the case in homeland security, where asset 
identification and control is dispersed to thousands of organizations who may or may not 
have a complete and accurate inventory.  Many homeland security contingency plans 
draw on mutual aid or regional agreements, often without full identification of assets and 
how they will work together.  CBP provides a mechanism for asset identification, but 
initially CBP will be hampered as homeland security officials gather and assess this 
information and their contribution to capability planning. 
In addition, resources include planning resources, skills, tools, and experiences.  
Defense communities normally have decades, if not centuries, of planning experience for 
concrete events and contingencies.  These communities bring to bear a wide range of 
tools such as wargaming, exercises, and simulations, and a small army of skilled and 
experienced planners devoted to such work.  Exercises and actual field experience are 
rapidly fed back to planners.  In contrast, homeland security is in the early stages of 
planning and is often not well-resourced with dedicated staff, particularly in smaller 
jurisdictions.  Tools and skills are still in development in government organizations.  
While emergency exercises have been the norm for a number of years, a systematic 
collection, evaluation,  and dissemination of lessons learned and better practices has only 
recently picked up speed.  The private sector in some critical infrastructure areas and for 
some companies may have the requisite resources, skills, tools, and experiences, or can 
draw on combined sector practices, but not all.  Non-governmental organizations, with 
limited resources, may also have difficulty in adopting CBP.  It can be expected there 
will be a slower identification of current and required capabilities and under what 
scenarios they are effective. 
A tiered CBP approach in homeland security may not adequately address the very 
wide variety of structures, skills, and processes for homeland security activities across the 
nation.  For example, Gilman (2004) noted that DHS does not understand, or chooses not 
to understand, that there is a major difference in homeland security or emergency 
preparedness operations and capacities between the rural and urban areas in a state or 
region.  He said that many homeland security and emergency management contacts are in 
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rural areas, and many are volunteers or handle homeland security along with many other 
tasks.  These officials often have limited infrastructure support, such as access to good 
communication services.  Rural areas also have more difficulty forming mutual aid 
compacts and, if they do, may get limited help because of geography or limited regional 
assets and liabilities.  Rural areas may have to wait many hours for mutual aid help to 
arrive because of the distances involved. 
4. Target Audience 
Finally, there are differences in the target audiences for CBP.  For the defense 
community, the clear customer for CBP outputs is the combatant commander who must 
carry out the defense missions and relies on mission capability packages.  For homeland 
security, the target audience at present is broadly described by DHS as the “homeland 
security community,” which can cover federal, state, local, private, and nongovernmental 
organizations, and even to the level of the individual citizen.  Thus, there is not a discrete 
set of homeland security “combatant commanders” under the current DHS CBP 
approach.  This has added to the complexity and confusion surrounding CBP that will 
require further attention. 
Federal national policy is primarily directed at state and local jurisdictions at this 
time, with some attention paid to limited regional compacts.  It may be that CBP 
development over time will clarify that the combatant commander should be those state 
and local government officials responsible for direct prevention, vulnerability reduction, 
and response and recovery activities.  While private sector and non-governmental 
officials have direct homeland security responsibilities as well, the CBP process may 
need to stop at the governmental level.  Governmental CBP outputs can be planning 
inputs to these other jurisdictions for their own planning processes. 
Instead of supporting the combatant commander, the capabilities-based approach 
might get bogged-down in a checklist mentality of responding to lists of many tasks 
represented by the UTL and a targeted list for critical capabilities.  “Checking off” the 
tasks forces attention to discrete activities, and not to capabilities and homeland security 
results for an organization and its homeland security partners.  State and local officials at 
the October 2004 capabilities workshop noted that the task lists and defined capabilities 
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easily can become a standard of care to which they will become individually accountable.  
A defensive posture might be to manage to the lists, and not to the overall results that 
must be achieved within a risk assessment decision-making process.  As a result, 
developing envelopes of capability for specific operational challenges for the combatant 
























VIII. A MELDED APPROACH 
A. REHABILITATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY CBP  
As the chapters to this point have highlighted, continuing to implement CBP 
through the current approach is fraught with difficulty.  The defense community CBP 
implementation experiences point to practices that the homeland security community 
should adopt or tailor to homeland security.  The differences between defense community 
and homeland security characteristics point to major issues in expecting there will be a 
seamless—and effective—transfer of CBP from defense to homeland security.  These 
issues also should be addressed as the HSPD-8 implementation moves forward. 
Some may argue that CBP presents too many implementation challenges and that 
DHS should consider some other approach in crafting a national preparedness goal and 
related objectives and measures.  The fact remains, however, that CBP does incorporate 
strong features in meeting homeland security results expectations and the DHS 
commitment to its implementation remains strong.  This chapter presents additional 
integration opportunities DHS might consider to “rehabilitate” CBP for the homeland 
security community.  These integration opportunities include 1) using a current national 
management standard as the overarching framework, 2) expanding capability coverage to 
more fully incorporate National Strategy for Homeland Security mission areas, and 3) 
building performance partnership and collaborative approaches and methods. 
1. National Management System Standard 
The first opportunity is using a national management system standard for an all-
hazards, risk-based approach for homeland security.  Standards for homeland security 
focus on jurisdictional capabilities that can meet multiple possible terrorist events and 
impacts (Yim, 2003; Yim and Caudle, 2004).  DHS’s current approach does not clearly 
start with local and state threats and risk-based responses.  Instead, DHS has taken a “top-
down” approach that identifies major preparedness events.  However, the events stressed 
for preparedness are well-defined catastrophic terrorist events, not all-hazards, and they 
are not risk-based at a jurisdictional level.  The interim national goal and related national 
preparedness guidance discuss state and regional tailoring, but the underlying thrust is 
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that the basic capabilities lists are considered minimum capabilities necessary for 
carrying out core competencies and essential tasks.  The assumption is that preparing for 
catastrophic terrorist events, represented in the vast majority of CBP planning scenarios 
prepares each jurisdiction for an all-hazards event in their jurisdiction and for the support 
of other jurisdictions or the nation in the event of a catastrophic event. 
The CBP lists are useful tools for planning, but should not be mandated.  It makes 
more sense for jurisdictions to select, implement, and sustain core capabilities contingent 
on their own risk assessment as to what is appropriate for all-hazards in the individual 
jurisdiction and agreements they actually have with other jurisdictions.  Contingency 
plans and mutual aid agreements would define capabilities needed if the core capabilities 
are overwhelmed by an event.  Core capabilities would be scaled to what is affordable 
and sustainable (and more likely to be used) at the state, local, and private level.  These 
may, or may not be, dependent on population size. 
Using a national standard, a full risk assessment would define what is appropriate 
for each jurisdiction and what it has agreed to support for other jurisdictions.  It is not 
practical, or necessary, for all jurisdictions to have capabilities, no matter how limited, to 
respond to a catastrophic event.  Jurisdictions should be required to have action plans and 
mutual aid agreements that activate regional, state, and/or federal capabilities if core 
capabilities are insufficient.  Nor should they be required to have a national focus.  For 
example, it is not justifiable to expect Tonopah, Nevada to have basic capabilities to meet 
a nuclear detonation in Los Angeles or a biological attack in Washington, DC.  Using a 
national standard framework also would preclude jurisdictions from merely taking a 
“checklist” approach that does not address the inherent uncertainty of possible major 
events. 
The current voluntary standard for homeland security and national preparedness is 
the National Fire Protection Association 1600 (NFPA 1600).  It is a standard that could 
be used in conjunction with CBP.  The NFPA 1600 standard provides a common set of 
criteria for disaster management, emergency management, and business continuity 
programs.  NFPA 1600 is intended to provide those with responsibility for these 
programs with the criteria to assess current programs or to develop, implement, or 
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maintain a program to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters and 
emergencies in an all-hazards approach.  The standard covers elements such as program 
administration and evaluation; hazard identification, risk assessment, and impact 
analysis; hazard mitigation; mutual aid; resource management; planning; and operations 
and procedures.  Examples of standards include 1) establishing performance objectives 
and conducting periodic evaluations, 2) identifying hazards, the likelihood of their 
occurrence, and the vulnerability of people, property, the environment, and the entity 
itself to those hazards, 3) developing and implementing a strategy to eliminate hazards or 
mitigate the effects of hazards that cannot be eliminated, and 4) develop the capability to 
direct, control, and coordinate response and recovery operations (NFPA, 2004). 
Working with DHS, the American National Standards Institute recommended to 
the 9/11 Commission that the NFPA 1600 standards, with adjustments recommended by 
a working group, be recognized as the national preparedness standard (ANSI, 2004).  The 
planned adjustments include 1) emphasizing an all-hazards approach, 2) emphasizing 
prevention and deterrence, 3) expanding mitigation strategies, 4) leveraging existing 
preparedness programs and capabilities, and 5) including partnership relationships and 
incentives, particularly those outside the organization involved in an interdependent, 
coordinated, and networked relationships (ANSI-HSSP Workshop, 2004).  In its final 
report, the 9/11 Commission recommended the adoption of the national preparedness 
standard and has urged DHS to promote its adoption.  However, DHS has been generally 
silent on its use in implementing HSPD-8, referring only to the Emergency Management 
Accreditation Program, which is based on NFPA 1600.  Because it is the national 
preparedness standard, NFPA 1600 can provide the general requirements for homeland 
security results management.  CBP planning can be used across the standard, such as 
identifying risks, establishing performance objectives, crafting strategies, and targeting 
capabilities—using DHS’s UTL and capabilities lists to meet jurisdictional needs or those 
developed in concert with partners. 
2. National Strategy for Homeland Security Mission Areas 
A second opportunity is full prevention, vulnerability reduction, and response and 
recovery mission coverage, such as that represented in the mission areas of the National 
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Strategy for Homeland Security.  The DHS documents stress that CBP is intended to 
address national preparedness to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover 
from major events.  In addition, CBP is to produce readiness measures and elements such 
as standards for preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the 
nation’s overall preparedness to respond to major events.  On their face, the ODP 
documents assume mission coverage of prevention, response, and recovery.  However, 
the more detailed CBP documents, such as capability lists and scenarios, tell another 
story.  It is clear that CBP’s “point of the spear” is preparedness for response after an 
event, with much less attention paid to prevention, protection, and recovery.  
Emphasizing response, while much easier to do than the other homeland security mission 
areas, is much too limited for a national preparedness goal, which should start with 
prevention. 
One solution is for DHS to much more strongly emphasize the fundamental focus 
of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  Although some, such as Goure’ (2004), 
have argued that the National Strategy provides relatively little, strategy, it does provide 
reasonable goal and mission areas as a framework for national preparedness.  The 
National Strategy defines the full scope of homeland security from prevention to response 
and recovery (this is consistent with the goals from the DHS 2004 Strategic Plan).  As 
discussed earlier, under the National Strategy, prevention means action at home and 
abroad to deter, prevent, and eliminate terrorism.  Vulnerability reduction means 
identifying and protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, detecting terrorist threats, 
and augmenting defenses, while balancing the benefits of mitigating risk against 
economic costs and infringements on individual liberty.  Response and recovery means 
managing the consequences of attacks, and building and maintaining the financial, legal, 
and social systems to recover.  These are similar to the DHS strategic goals of awareness, 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery. 
As mentioned earlier, the National Strategy provides six critical mission areas 
(intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, 
critical infrastructure and key asset protection, catastrophic threat defense, and 
emergency preparedness and response) that might serve to balance the attention in the 
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CBP mission scope and related capabilities for federal, state, local, and private 
jurisdictions.  The latest homeland security federal budget request emphasizes that the 
federal government is using the National Strategy for Homeland Security to guide its 
homeland security goals and budgets. 
In the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget proposal, agencies categorize their 
funding data based on the critical mission areas defined in the National Strategy (United 
States Government 2005).  Updating the National Strategy descriptions, the budget 
proposal describes the intelligence and warning mission area as covering activities to 
detect terrorist threats and disseminate terrorist-threat information.  The category includes 
intelligence collection, risk analysis, and threat-vulnerability integration activities for 
preventing terrorist attacks.  It also includes information sharing activities among federal, 
state and local governments, relevant private sector entities (particularly custodians of 
critical infrastructure), and the public at large. The major requirements addressed in the 
intelligence and warning mission include: 1) unifying and enhancing intelligence and 
analytical capabilities to ensure officials have the information they need to prevent 
attacks, and 2) implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System and other 
information sharing and warning mechanisms to allow federal, state, local, and private 
authorities to take action to prevent attacks and protect potential targets. 
The border and transportation security mission area covers activities to 
protect border and transportation systems, such as screening airport passengers and 
detecting dangerous materials at ports overseas and at U.S. ports-of-entry.  The strategy 
aims to make the U.S. borders “smarter”—targeting resources toward the highest risks 
and sharing information so that frontline personnel can stay ahead of potential 
adversaries—while facilitating the flow of legitimate visitors and commerce. 
The domestic counterterrorism mission area covers federal and federally-
funded supported efforts to identify, thwart, and prosecute terrorists in the United States.  
The major requirements in the mission area are 1) developing a proactive law 
enforcement capability to prevent terrorist attacks, 2) apprehending potential terrorists, 
and 3) improving law enforcement cooperation and information sharing to enhance 
domestic counterterrorism efforts across all levels of government. 
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The mission area of protecting critical infrastructure and key assets includes 
the efforts of the U.S. government to secure the nation’s infrastructure, including 
information infrastructure, from terrorist attacks.  Major requirements include 1) unifying 
disparate efforts to protect critical infrastructure across the federal government, and with 
state, local, and private stakeholders, 2) building and maintaining a complete and 
accurate assessment of America’s critical infrastructure and key assets and prioritizing 
protective action based on risk, 3) enabling effective partnerships to protect critical 
infrastructure, and 4) reducing threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace. 
The mission area of defending against catastrophic attacks covers activities to 
research, develop, and deploy technologies, systems, and medical measures to detect and 
counter the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.  
The major requirements in this mission area include 1) developing countermeasures, 
including broad spectrum vaccines, antimicrobials, and antidotes, and 2) preventing 
terrorist use of CBRN weapons through detection systems and procedures, and improving 
decontamination techniques. 
The emergency preparedness and response mission area covers agency efforts 
to prepare for and minimize the damage from major incidents and disasters, particularly 
terrorist attacks that endanger lives and property or disrupt government operations.  The 
major requirements in this mission area include 1) establishing measurable goals for 
national preparedness and ensuring that federal funding supports these goals, 2) ensuring 
that federal programs to train and equip states and localities meet national preparedness 
goals in a coordinated and complementary manner, 3) encouraging standardization and 
interoperability of first responder equipment, especially for communications, 4) building 
a national training exercise, and evaluation system, 5) implementing the National 
Incident Management System, 6) preparing health care providers for a mass casualty 
event, and 7) augmenting America’s pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpiles. 
These budget proposal details could serve as better categories for capability 




3. Partnership Approaches 
Finally, DHS’s approach to CBP does not adequately recognize or provide 
incentives for partnerships in tailoring and sustaining capabilities as part of a joint 
approach and at a strategic alliance level.  The DHS documents do discuss mission area 
assessments for entities operating individually or together.  However, there are no 
incentives for partnering.  In addition, the current CBP lists are designed for individual 
jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local levels, with scorecards for each jurisdiction, 
and subsequent lists planned for the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and 
even citizens.  Such an approach further exacerbates any thought of partnerships and 
creates organizational stovepiping of capabilities.  Further, state and local governments 
have sovereignty in our federalist system and the private and non-governmental sector are 
under no obligation (other than what the federal government might create through law or 
regulation) to meet capability requirements. 
In practice, given federal funding mechanisms, individual entity budgeting and 
funding requirements, and liability concerns, entities will not normally build in formal 
partnerships for response to a major event, particularly if they consider a major event 
unlikely.  Mutual aid agreements often call for reimbursement and liability assignment, 
both barriers to partnerships.  In a recent report, GAO (2004d) observed that historically, 
the American governance system, divided into federal, state, and local jurisdictions, does 
not provide a natural vehicle for addressing public policy issues from a regional, multi-
jurisdictional perspective. There are different operational structures and civic traditions of 
states and municipalities.  Strategic plans in regional coordination efforts can result in 
mutually agreed upon problems and solutions.  GAO observed that regional approaches 
have been recognized a key way to address the threat of terrorism as in many urban areas, 
the threat of terror is regionwide and resources for responding to the threat are distributed 
among many jurisdictions. 
Achieving strategic alliances for homeland security will require considerable 
effort by all partners.  Klitgaard and Treverton (2004) write that partnerships stretch from 
partial collaboration on one end to virtual integration on the other.  Partnerships evolve as 
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partners move from limited and wary collaboration to realizing they have more common 
interests and joint possibilities.  At the integrative stage, the alliance becomes strategic 
and the boundaries between the organizations begin to blur.  The partnership comes to 
resemble an integrated joint venture that is critical to the strategies of both partners and 
can respond to the changing environment.  Homeland security strategic partnerships will 
be particularly important given the differences in jurisdictional planning resources, skills, 
tools, experiences, and level of commitment that can be brought to bear in adopting 
capabilities. 
However, there are many partnership and incentive approaches that can be 
considered for homeland security to complement CBP.  Radin (2000) discusses several 
different approaches that have been taken within federal agencies to deal with issues of 
performance.  One that is particularly attractive for homeland security is performance 
partnerships.  Performance partnerships include combining resources from both players 
to achieve a pre-specified end-state.  The performance partnerships entered into by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and states have been among the most visible of 
these arrangements.  States and EPA determine on an annual basis what and how work 
will be performed. 
As described by Metzenbaum (2005), EPA and states cooperated to produce the 
National Performance Partnership System (NEPPS).  EPA and the states reach agreement 
on a common set of performance measures every state would report for purposes of 
national environmental assessments.  Each state participating in the partnership system 
identifies appropriate state-specific environmental performance goals and measures.  The 
states would work with EPA in an equal partnership to select, test, develop, adopt, and 
update the measures.  States are expected to conduct self-assessments and share them 
with the public.  Based on both the state’s and EPA’s assessment of environmental 
conditions and state program performance, each state and EPA would sign an agreement 
regarding appropriate national and state-specific environmental goals, program 
performance indicators, state commitments for specific deliverables and activities to 
address identified needs, disinvestments, and federal commitments. 
 85
The same approach could be taken in partnerships between federal and state 
governments, and state governments and local governments for homeland security 
expectations.  CBP could be one tool used to define the capabilities, but these would not 
be nationally mandated.  Instead, each state and DHS would enter into an agreement 
regarding federal and state-specific homeland security goals, measures, and activities.  
Each partner would have defined commitments for developing capabilities to meet the 
homeland security goals.  A good example is the environmental approach used for the 
Chesapeake Bay in the Mid-Atlantic region.  Several states and the federal government 
entered into an agreement with clear goals and targets to protect and restore the Bay 
(Chesapeake Bay Program 2000). 
B. CONCLUSION 
The present DHS approach to homeland security CBP has considerable merit.  Its 
focus on capability packages anticipating uncertainty and a wide range of possible events 
sets outcome expectations.  Measurement will focus on outputs and processes that 
reasonably can be expected to comprise preparedness. 
However, the approach also has challenges, many resulting from the scope of the 
effort, the many stakeholders involved, resource constraints, and the many decision 
processes that are impacted.  Without considering the melded approach presented above, 
the specific capability packages to make the homeland more secure still require 
definition, particularly the differentiating joint and combined capabilities of public and 
private organizations.  Federal, state, local, and private leadership is apparent, but that 
leadership needs to be better defined and exercised in homeland security CBP efforts.  
The target audience—a clear homeland security combatant commander—should be 
defined. 
In addition, resource leverage, while rhetorically championed, is often lost in the 
morass of budgeting and funding systems across the country and the difficulty in working 
out formal mutual aid agreements or informal understandings.  Capability options will be 
difficult to assess for costs and effectiveness.  Some, such as Carafano and others (2005) 
argue that the capabilities-based model is open-ended despite the fact it is not practical to 
budget for every desired capability.  There will be differences of opinion as to what 
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should be the precise homeland security goals to define capabilities.  Risk management 
for CBP now relies on limited near-term, terrorist-centric scenarios, necessitating 
additional work for all-hazards preparedness and much longer-term efforts.  Federal tools 
and programs responsive to HSPD-8 and CBP still are in their infancy, but will be 
expected to create cost-effective homeland security approaches for homeland security.  
Lastly, CBP should create the assessment tools to address preparedness for addressing the 
spectrum of current and future threats, but that assessment process, supported by robust 
analytical tools, may be years off. 
The continued identification and resolution of national preparedness goal issues 
should be addressed as CBP is implemented over the next several years.  The defense 
community experience indicates that there can be many variations from the generic CBP 
model for defense planning.  Without a focus on robust homeland security mission areas, 
a more flexible approach such as that available through a national management standard 
system, and the use of performance partnerships, CBP will not easily be institutionalized.  
Over time, the melded approach provides a more robust and flexible framework to make 
difficult choices about what homeland security expectations should be when faced with 
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